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THE
SOUTHWESTERN SOCIAL SCIENCE
QUARTERLY

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No. 2

The Function of the Social Sciences in a University¹

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Rebecca West speaks somewhere of the air which characterizes an old general and a bishop. One cannot describe the indescribable, but it is enough to say that Miss West was referring to that indefinable something that one also detects in a professor of one of the Social Sciences in the presence of lesser breeds without the Law. There was a time, so the oldsters say, when professors of Greek or of Latin moved in that Olympian majesty. Even without their whiskers the classicists were in good position to maintain the blend of reserve and condescension that befits the Lords of Creation. For theirs was an esoteric knowledge, the key a difficult tongue, but the reward, noble thought, a delightful literature and even a broad naughtiness which outmoderns the moderns, although the latter, poor dears, think they invented it.

In recent years, of course, the classicists were succeeded by the Natural Scientists. Their uniforms were different, as were the instruments of their magic. I have not yet seen a doctoral dissertation on the subject, but it is possible that the difficulty in keeping one's whiskers out of the test tubes may have contributed to the passing of those virile accessories. At any rate, the Natural Scientists reigned supreme. They were the custodians of Nature's secrets, and they went about discussing unblushingly the inner workings of men and animals or tossing off millions of years or even light-years with the glibness of a Wall Street broker in the 'twenties.

¹ An address delivered at the twenty-first annual meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, Dallas, Texas, March 22, 1940.

And now the world is ours. I hasten to use the first personal pronoun, for I would have you know that I am not merely a college president; I am a priest of the academic Establishment, for I once taught a subject listed in some college catalogues as among the Social Sciences. I have even written a book or so somewhere in the field, a fact which I believe my publishers would be willing for me to admit, although hereto it has been practically a secret between us.

The Social Sciences have arrived. The professors thereof can now act like bishops and old generals, accustomed to command and hardened to flattery. We are, of course, not disdainful of our less fortunate colleagues of the Humanities and the Natural Sciences. However we feel about them, we are kind.

The ethicists tell us, I believe, that one should be satisfied with the consciousness of noble conduct without desiring the rewards. This is doubtless true, but usually one is better content when, having acted well, he gets what is so obviously due him. There is nothing so discouraging to moral endeavor as when one assiduously follows the precept, "early to bed and early to rise," and then finds that he is still poor, rheumatic, and something of a fool. We of the Social Sciences are big enough to be content with the knowledge that we are of the academic aristocracy, but it is good also to have the rights and privileges appertaining thereto.

There was a time when we watched with concern the glaring light of publicity which beat about the Natural Scientist. We were sure that it was not good for him; it led him away from his true interests; in some instances it turned his head. And when some colleague ostentatiously closed his desk and with hypocritical expressions of regret went away to accept a high salary for advising an industrial concern as to how many corn shucks could be safely put in a breakfast food, we sat dispirited in our little corners and questioned the justice of the universe. Not so today. Even before the alphabet agencies burst upon the Social Sciences like a tropical dawn, business and industry had discovered the economist and the business analyst, the psychologist and the tax expert. But now Israel has indeed come into his own. We do not want to be condescending, but no natural scientists ever walked in and out of the White House as presidential advisers as have the representatives of our Division. And as for being on government payrolls—one desists out of pity for one's less fortunate colleagues.

Of course, if one really cares to be scientific about it, the best way to determine the relative public importance of the various divisions, the Humanities, the Natural Sciences, and the Social Sciences, is to study the records of those who are fired from American Universities—of those who have “ended their usefulness,” as the saying is. Again, we remember when biologists and geologists and astronomers walked self-consciously on the dizzy edges of heresy. Every now and again some college president called for a resignation; and the ensuing investigation by the A.A.U.P., the newspaper publicity, the statements and counter-statements by administration and professors, and the letters written to the papers by *Pro Bono Publico*, all testified to public interest in a vital subject. But the times have changed. There are few communities which would rise to arms because of a professor's opinions about Moses; but there are also few communities which would *not* rise in arms concerning a professor's opinions about Karl Marx—if they were the wrong opinions. The college president no longer cares when or where the professor of geology delivers his soul, but when the administration hears that the professor of economics is about to deliver an address or be delivered of a book, the president paces the floor of his bedroom hoping that Gabriel will decide to use the coming morn for his trumpet work. The Social Sciences have been decorated with the last mark of popular interest.

There are, it is true, certain dangers for those who walk in such majesty. I am supposed to speak to you on “The Function of the Social Sciences in a University,” a fact which you may think has escaped my attention. But I should like to point out that there is some danger that the Social Sciences will swallow up all else in the University. There has, indeed, been some difficulty already in classifying the subjects in the college curriculum. Influenced by the prevalence of trinity in history, there has been a preference for three divisions: the Humanities, the Natural Sciences and the Social Sciences. In Chicago, as you all know, history refused to be classed in either division, and now occupies a position embarrassing to such a venerable discipline, sitting on the fence partly in the Humanities and partly in the Social Sciences. Philosophy, wandering aloof and perhaps a little lonely through the new curricula, has in many places taken refuge unhesitatingly among the Social Sciences. But difficult as it is for one to grasp, it is nevertheless necessary to remember that the Social Sciences are really only one division of the curriculum.

While the Social Science Division has gone far toward an integration of the curriculum and has tended to prevent the apparently native centrifugal tendency of all college professors, the Social Sciences themselves are not secure from the dangers of specialization. We are remembering now that the Social Sciences are not simply for research but that they also form a division in the college curriculum. Our forefathers had many hearty laughs at the grammarian who spent his life settling hoti's case; but there are mechanics in all disciplines, and it is possible to exalt the mechanics at the expense of the discipline itself. We may, for example, gather statistics about the bathrooms in American homes. Now it is possible that we would not go to quite the same trouble to bury the bathroom statistician as Browning seemed to think was necessary in conducting the funeral of the grammarian. Yet the bathroom statistician and the man who spent his life in settling hoti's case may have been carrying on a most useful labor. But it has been said that some have developed a profound aversion to Greek literature because they fell into the hands of an enthusiast concerning hoti, and it is entirely possible to make the same mistake in the Social Sciences.

As a matter of fact, the very word *science* tells us part of our danger. The Social Sciences have come to their present status through a period when the Natural Sciences ruled in solitary grandeur, and it may be that the shadow of the test tube has not been entirely removed from us. The development of pseudo-scientific jargons and the passion for accumulating facts, whether relevant or not, are symptoms that some irreverent people think point to an hereditary disease that has not been entirely eradicated. Because the Social Sciences are securely tied into important and interesting research, the danger to the college curriculum is all the more pressing. To accumulate these facts and then, as the saying goes, to sit down humbly before them are not always signs of a scientific spirit. One feels that some have sat down before the facts because they did not know what else to do with them; and certainly the average college student gets very little intellectual nourishment from contemplating an assembly of facts unless he can do something toward interpreting them. It must have been a frightful thing for the college student to be drowned in the musty vats of scholastic learning, but it is also possible to be drowned in a running stream. The experience is doubtless not more pleasant because the water is fresh.

Stephen Leacock, a distinguished teacher of economics, remarked recently: "When opinion gets confused—living opinion—the colleges

can always fall back on the opinion of the dead. If living men can't think, let's have a catalogue of all that dead men ever thought, and the students can learn that. In fact, economics can be all dosed up with history, as doctors dose up a patient with iron." Later he has a word concerning statistics. "And statistics. If we don't understand the industrial world, at least let us have statistics. The continental area of the United States is 3,026,789 square miles, and the number of spindles in Lowell, Massachusetts is 201,608 (or is it?) That's the stuff. Make a four-year course and give a degree in it." However, you must not take this too seriously. The man who wrote this is getting old; and, besides, I think he was trying to be funny.

It might also be remarked that the Social Sciences, if one continues to speak of them as an academic discipline—or, more modernly, as a part of the college curriculum—may suffer by the fact that they are so vitally related to the common life. It has long been an accusation against college professors that association with immature minds leaves its mark. This was, I believe, a common criticism of President Woodrow Wilson. I am informed, however, that college faculties are in the habit of remarking that too much association with business men leaves its mark on college presidents. It is hinted, I believe, that presidents, forced to think and talk too much about money, sometimes develop an attitude that at the best is tolerant and at the worst is contemptuous of other intellectual interests. That a college exists for the instruction of students is too easily forgotten by those whose work demands constant touch with the so-called practical problems of the institution.

It is to the glory of the Social Sciences that they are vitally related to business and government and they have come into the staid and sometimes ossified curriculum as a breath of fresh air from the land of the living; but it is possible that social scientists by their constant contact with business and government may become impatient with the tamer, school-teachery task of the classroom. It will be unfortunate if the very virtues of the Social Sciences should develop in the professors thereof the worst faults of college presidents. I think even the most hardened educator would shudder at the thought of having on the campus of any college a dozen or five dozen college presidents.

What I am suggesting, therefore, is that the Social Sciences have a function in the college curriculum. They are not divinely anointed to take over the whole thing.

By definition the Social Sciences deal with the social aspects of human life. This, I need not remind you, is not new in itself. Our fathers did not read the Greek and Roman classics simply to enjoy the acrobatics of Greek syntax nor to satisfy their detective instincts by hunting the antecedents of Cicero's relative clauses. They had no where else to go for such a variety of sources concerning human government, human society, the whole gamut of human behavior in society. England trained generations of administrators on the best source books on government then available. The distinction of the Social Sciences, therefore, lies not in discovering social behavior but in bringing scientific techniques to the study of this behavior.

Nor has there ever been a time when men were not primarily interested in contemporary life. They have listened to tales of other days and have solaced themselves in hopes for an eternal future; but the merest tyro in history knows that man has always been interested in his crops, in his friends, in his guilds, in his courts, in his government. Again, our distinction is not that we have discovered the lure of the contemporary but in the means that we have brought to the understanding of what is around us.

The formlessness of modern university and college curricula has been evident to all. The breaking down of the curriculum into subjects, each guarded and exalted by a special department, has had tragic results for higher education. The college has become a loose federation keeping an armed peace; and the student has been expected to find his way through the tangle of courses and offerings giving such unity as his tortured mind might conceive to the cafeteria-like assemblage. In theory, at least, the Social Sciences have brought the unity of an organizing interest. Business administration, sociology, history, economics, or whatever else, have been brought together for the light they could throw upon society. The purpose has been to understand and to control. If the purpose be kept in view, the student can presumably learn to bring to bear upon his study of society the different scientific techniques and the accumulation of facts and the guiding principles which have been discovered, so that at last we have a demonstration of the true practicality of higher learning.

I fear that I am speaking of the theory. Promising as is the ideal, we have not yet attained it. Our Social Science Divisions are often cluttered up in the good old-fashioned way, clogged by inter-departmental

rivalries, tied down by educational red tape and inhibited by academic taboos. It is unfortunately as true of Social Science Divisions as of some others that the student who stays with the procession has a long road.

The Social Sciences are, however, pointing the way in many institutions to an integration of the curriculum which promises some end to the bad academic housekeeping that has characterized too many American institutions of higher learning.

There is another service which the Social Sciences are performing in our universities. They are links between the learning of the scholar and the practical work of society. In a sense there is the tie everywhere in the college curriculum, but it is obvious in the Social Sciences. It is not so much that the Social Sciences grade off imperceptibly into vocational courses, but that there is a definite linking of the college with the problems which are looming largest before the ordinary man. Someone has said that the rise of dictators is the rebellion of the common man against the specialist. If this is so, then a heavy responsibility rests upon the social scientist to demonstrate that the specialist in social matters has something relevant to say.

It is perhaps not too much to say that the social scientist bears a heavy burden as an academic person who must sail where two tides meet. The tremendous pressure of immediate and so-called practical interests can not be evaded. Men want to know how to plan cities, to plant their crops, to order their business, to manage their families, to vote in their elections. The social scientist can not retire to his ivory tower away from these pressing demands. But he can not forget also that he is aware, as presumably others may not be, of the history of man's experiments, of the fallibility of man's reasoning, of the wildness of his guesses, of the changes in his scientific thinking. The social scientist knows how much he does not yet know and how tentative are his judgments. He must resist on the one hand the temptation to a detachment which is born of laziness and defeatism, and on the other hand, the temptation to accept messianic responsibility.

One more temptation peculiar to this mediating position of the social scientist is either to ignore the practical work which is an application of such special knowledge as the social scientist has, or, on the other hand, to become entangled entirely in the application. On the side next the social scientists the wall between town and gown has been most nearly torn down. For this reason the future of the college or

perhaps the nature of the college of the future may well be in the hands of the social scientist.

It is then in integrating the work of many specialists, in bringing to bear facts of contemporary life upon our common problem of man in society, that the Social Sciences function first in the curriculum. And secondly they make their total impact in that they are directly linked with the problems of the man on the street.

State Control of Local Budgeting

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In recent years the whole field of state supervision over local affairs has received a great deal of attention. One of the most important aspects of the question is that of state control of local finance, especially of budgets, and it is this phase of the larger field that is dealt with in this paper. An effort is made here to lay a general background, after which Texas experience along these lines is discussed.

It may be true that local expenditure from local sources rose only 2.4 per cent from 1932 to 1938; however, the fact should not be lost sight of that these local units spent \$1,570,000,000 of federal and state grants as contrasted to \$749,000,000 in 1932, not to mention the large WPA outlays that supplemented or substituted for local expenditure.¹ Local government narrowly escaped a breakdown during these depression years. To avoid recurrence of similar conditions, extreme discretion should be exercised.

As a means of warding off these recurrences, we have come to think and speak of methods of controlling local expenditures. One of those means is state supervision of local budgets. Sidney Webb is reputed to have said that localities need aid to prevent the crushing weight of the cost of government; smaller units require the counsel and information of those with greater experience; negligent and apathetic authorities need outside incitements to bring their administration to a national minimum; and finance officers serve better when checked by an independent audit of accounts.

The first question, then, is: Why state supervision of local budgets? Local units of government are either administrative subdivisions of or creatures of the state, and it is the recognized function of the individual states in the American system of government to establish the legal foundation for the operation of their local units. These units are always subject to state law in the exercise of the powers conferred upon them by their creators. Recent years have only placed more responsibility upon

¹ These figures are taken from an unpublished paper of Dr. Wylie Kilpatrick entitled "Questions in State Supervision of Local Budgeting."

the states for protecting the solvency of the creatures they have brought into existence. As a matter of fact, it is no longer a question of whether or not there should be state supervision—but rather what form this oversight should take. Will the state continue constitutional and statutory regulations or modernize its form of direction to administrative guidance?

Budgeting can be used as an administrative control system. But the state must broaden its conception of budgeting to personnel, material, capital improvements, and functional services. As Dr. Wylie Kilpatrick says, "budgeting can no longer be viewed as a purely financial system."² Budgeting cannot be isolated from the other administrative processes, for by so doing it will be disregarded and pass with the wind. To have real value it must be integrated and used along with the other governmental operations.

Nor is there any one method of state supervision of local financial matters. It is true that a state agency of some kind might exercise specific powers, but supervision is a whip with many lashes. The state might enter into a joint administration of standards with the local communities, build up a co-operative relationship with the local officials, or actually do the work. Supervision then may range from advice-giving at one extreme to practically doing the job at the other.

Experience has demonstrated at least one principle in regard to the supervision of local finance, namely, that any effort exerted by the state will avail little unless it is articulated with local units which are willing to co-operate with the state. An efficient local financial organization must exist together with local officers who are capable and willing to co-operate. The local officer is himself a supervisory official. Thus the state's task loses its magnitude when the local financial office is equipped with sufficient power and competent personnel. An integrated local organization and improved personnel can only make for better co-operation between the state and local units regardless of the function or service performed.

The state, too, must do its part. To quote Dr. Kitpatrick again, "Most of the state budget laws, especially the later statutes, provide for a so-called budget preparing officer in each local unit. Obviously, the state regulation is worthless unless a local officer, the executive, chief finance officer, or clerk is vested with responsibility for drafting and

² Wylie Kilpatrick, *State Supervision of Local Budgeting*, 1939, p. 78.

submitting the budget to the governing body. Designation of a budget officer, however, is far from fulfilling budgetary needs. The state act may be vague in requiring a local budget officer without designating him in accordance with the various forms of local structure. Specifications of a budget officer by the state statute is inadequate unless the law clothes him with authority to control the process of budget preparation during the stages of assembling of data, estimation, and reporting. Equally vital and more often neglected by state codes is the authority of the budget officer during the execution of the budget. Here the state law should make unmistakable this officer's authority to oversee administration, make allotments, and to control expenditure within the limits of appropriations and collected revenues."³

It is not necessary that the state agency be large or unduly expensive; however, it should be composed of capable specialists willing to render consulting and supervisory services to the local officials and the taxpayers.

Our one great problem in government today is that of centralizing responsibility and at the same time holding the official responsible to the taxpaying public. Proper budgeting provides a very important tool whereby the citizen may hold his officers accountable to him.

The question as to when supervision is to be applied is sure to arise. New Jersey about two years ago set up five tests to determine whether the finances of a municipality had reached such a condition as to warrant state intervention. If after an examination and hearing by the Board of Local Government any of the following five tests were found to exist, the locality in question was compelled to submit to certain controls until conditions improved. The tests were:

- (1) Default on the principal or interest of bonded obligations.
- (2) Payments due other jurisdictions more than two years in arrears.
- (3) In municipalities on a cash basis budget, a cash deficit for the last two years in excess of 5 per cent of the total amount of taxes levied by the municipality.
- (4) Tax delinquency so pronounced that tax collections were less than 50 per cent during the year of levy for the last two years and more than 25 per cent of the first year's taxes were outstanding at the end of the second year.
- (5) Whenever liquidation of floating debt requires an appropriation

³ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

of more than 25 per cent of the total of all other items of the preceding year's budget.

When the state will apply its controls will of necessity depend upon the special nature of the need for them. Audits usually take place annually; investigations and surveys may occur at longer intervals, or upon the demand of local officials, the discretion of the state agency, or at the request of the local taxpayers. The state should certainly at all times be in a position to enforce minimum fiscal standards as might be applicable to the local units. A tentative criterion might be provided which would sanction definite state control when one or more of the following evidences occur within the local community: "(1) debt defaults requiring outside adjustment, (2) excessive and chronic tax delinquency, (3) unremedied and continued budget deficits, (4) persistent violation of budget and fiscal law, and (5) exorbitant local expenditure above defined ratios."⁴

It becomes incumbent upon the state, therefore, to require that the local unit use a budget of the proper form and to enforce local compliance with state fiscal requirements in regard to accounting, auditing, budgeting, borrowing, planning and reporting. These requirements no doubt should be at a minimum to begin with, but may be improved as time and experience dictate.

Experience has demonstrated that a modern system of budget control is desirable to the negative type exercised through tax limitation.⁵ All too frequently in the past have the various methods of control failed, and partly because of the fact, no doubt, that they lacked public support. Accountability to the voter should not be overlooked in any control scheme that is devised. Proper state supervision makes it possible for public opinion to function more effectively. Citizen control groups are provided with better aids and tools with which to work. This factor should not be regarded lightly since we are recognizing the advantage, as well as the necessity, of making government more accountable to the public.

Having described our problem in somewhat general terms, it should be of interest to note what has occurred in Texas. Not so many years ago the state extended its authority with the aim of improving the budgetary procedure of the local subdivisions. The Forty-Second Legisla-

⁴ See the unpublished paper cited in Note 1.

⁵ H. C. Loefer, *Boston's Tax Limits, and the Local Application of the Municipal Finance Act, Chapter 44, General Laws*, Boston, 1935, mimeographed.

ture in 1931 passed an act which has come to be known as the "Texas Uniform Budget Law." Of its twenty-two sections, numbers thirteen through sixteen deal with municipalities.⁶ They not only prescribe the contents of the budget but they clearly set forth the procedure for its enactment and its execution. If this law were complied with, the budget would furnish a blueprint of city finances. A complete financial statement, revealing outstanding obligations and the cash on hand to the credit of each fund, is required. There must be enough itemization to make possible a comparison between expenditures for the coming year and corresponding expenditures of the year past. Likewise, the fundamental steps of drafting a good budget are set out in the law. The executive is made the budget officer, and he is given the power to require information of other municipal officers. A public hearing is provided for; the city council is made responsible for enacting the budget into law. Finally, the state is given a wedge by which it can enter into municipal affairs, for a copy of each budget must be filed with the State Comptroller at Austin. The budget, then, becomes the guide book of the city's fiscal operations. Taxes must be levied in accordance with it, and expenditures must follow it. These provisions dealing with contents, enactment, and execution of the budget lay the foundation for a sound municipal budget program.⁷

What, if any, are the shortcomings of this law? To be sure, some of the finer points of the art of budgeting are omitted. A good budget takes shape in a budget message, a budget summary, and supporting schedules.⁸ In its Model Budget Law, the National Municipal League guarantees observation of the spending part of the budget bill by the enactment of an appropriation ordinance. Monthly or quarterly allotments could have been provided for in the Texas statute; the transfer of appropriations could have been mentioned. But even though these important branches of budgeting are omitted, the legal provisions of the trunk of the Texas municipal budget tree are fairly substantial.

But judged from the number of cities filing their budgets with the proper authorities, the law is losing prestige. In 1932-33, 192 cities filed, 137 in 1933-34, approximately 60 for 1934-35, 109 for 1935-36, 118 for 1936-37, 105 for 1937-38, 117 for 1938-39, and 102 for 1939-40.

⁶ *Vernon's Texas Statutes*, 1936, Art. 689a-13 through 16.

⁷ For a more detailed treatment of these matters see Stuart A. MacCorkle, *State Financial Control Over Cities in Texas*, Arnold Foundation Studies in Public Affairs, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas, Vol. VI, 1937.

⁸ See A. E. Buck, *Public Budgeting*, 1929.

At no time have more than one-third of the cities ever filed their budgets with the State Comptroller as required by law. The budgets filed leave much to be desired. Sometimes a mere financial statement is sent in; often the anticipated revenues are omitted; sometimes the prospective tax rate is not included. The conclusion is obvious that some sizeable cities of Texas do not even use a budget. From time to time the Comptroller's office receives letters of inquiry from cities which request assistance in meeting the requirements of the law. Unequipped as his department is to deal with these requests, that official can only refer the cities to the statute and to their charters. It is apparent that one place where the budget law of Texas falls short is at the point of state supervision and control.

The "Texas Uniform Budget Law" passed in 1931 carried provisions regarding counties, as well as for cities. It made the county judge the budget officer, but in the preparation of such he is given the assistance of the auditor, or in counties having no auditor, the county clerk. The statute provides that "the budget must also be so prepared as to show as definitely as possible each of the various projects for which appropriations are set up in the budget, and the estimated amount of money carried in the budget for each of such projects. The budget shall also contain a complete financial statement of the county, showing all outstanding obligations of the county, the cash on hand to the credit of each and every fund of the county government, the funds received from all sources during the previous year, . . . the estimated revenues available to cover the proposed budget and the estimated rate of tax which will be required."⁹

A public hearing is provided before the budget is finally adopted by the commissioner's court, any taxpayer having the right to be present and to participate. In counties with population less than 350,000, the county judge must report to the State Comptroller the facts in the budget by forwarding a copy of the completed document.¹⁰ Under the state organization, the Comptroller is little more than an accounting and collecting agent for the state, having no powers of control over subdivisions of the state.

Without budget forms to guide them, and with only the statement of the law to point the way, the local units in Texas must prepare their budgets. The result has been that local divisions drawing up budgets

⁹ *Vernon's Texas Statutes*, 1936, Art. 689a-9.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Art. 689a-11.

have done so according to their own wishes. Likewise, budgets to be useful must be accurate. Local officers in Texas are too often without sufficient information, both as to the purpose of the budget and as to the mechanics of budgeting control.

State control over local finance in Texas has gone this far and no farther: (1) the enactment of laws covering the subjects to be controlled; (2) the requirement that local officers take an oath to obey and carry out the law; and (3) the indictment in a court of law in case some complaint is filed against an offending officer. The state exercises no supervision over local finance either in regard to auditing standards or budgetary forms. State administrative supervision is shied away from by both state and local officials. The Texan in regard to this matter has followed the common bent to "pass a law" and then promptly to forget the entire matter.

State supervision over local budgeting in Texas has failed for several reasons:

First, legislative enactment alone by no means sets up a control system. Without administrative agencies to carry out the will of the legislature little or nothing can be accomplished;

Second, there has been no state agency with authority to compel local officers to comply with the law;

Third, on the whole neither state officials, local officials, nor the public have realized the scope, purpose, means or ends of budgetary supervision;

Fourth, a lack of personnel as well as the absence of technically trained personnel for both levels of government has had its effect.

It may be said that Texas erred in the beginning by placing too much emphasis upon constitutional and legislative supervision, with the result that state control is wooden, fixed and rigid. Such limitations are hopelessly haphazard in theory as well as in practice. To prescribe uniformity for all taxing districts, or even for certain classes of communities, disregards entirely variations that may affect finances and resources of the individual units. To provide the same limits year after year is to ignore wide fluctuations in economic conditions and the rapid increase in municipal services which a modern society demands. This attempt at uniformity becomes more ridiculous when it is recalled that assessments vary between local units and often from time to time within the unit itself. Furthermore, the absence of a relationship between assessed valuation on the one hand and the needs of the community on the other, the

ability to finance such needs, and the willingness to pay for them, render constitution restrictions very unsatisfactory. In fact, they often exist only on paper and are frequently side-stepped by some method or means, or are simply disregarded.

The state has not established a bureau of local finance and centralized in it all matters pertaining to such functions. There is no examination of accounting records of the various units; no accounting system has been installed; financial reports are required, but include only debts and budgets. Budget procedure and the content of budgets are provided for by statute; however, there is no state agency which prescribes an up-to-date budget form.

It is apparent that there is a definite need for a competent and unbiased state agency to which local officials may turn for advice in handling their financial problems. On the other hand, the state should not assume the position of a policeman and attempt a rigid regulation of all local finance. Drastic control of local finance by the state has failed too often for such a method to be proposed as a panacea. Rigid control often serves as a hindrance to progressive local administration. It is not possible to lay down a single method or formula which will prove a dependable and effective means of control in all situations and in all communities. There must be reliance not on one but on several methods of control which, operated together, may be effective when any one method fails. But all this does not mean that the state is to be relieved of its responsibility.

A Scale for the Measurement of Farm Family Socio-Economic Status*

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Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College

THE PROBLEM

Although no sociometric scale has ever been constructed and standardized for the measurement of farm family socio-economic status, rural research workers have long been aware of the need for an accurate index of this variable.¹ The limitations of rough but commonly used indicators such as tenure status have forced them to depend on detailed budget analysis, farm business statements, and other related data for reasonably accurate approximations to farm family socio-economic status. Since these data are difficult to obtain accurately and appear to many investigators to give only a partial description of the variable, it is not surprising to find that some have turned to rough unstandardized multiple factor indexes, and others to scales constructed and standardized for use on urban families. Needless to say these likewise have been of questionable value. Thus it appears that there is a definite need for a relatively simple scale that will produce a valid and reliable quantitative measurement of the socio-economic status of farm families. This paper is a brief preliminary report of a study the purpose of which was to construct and standardize such a scale.²

SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS DEFINED

Despite the fact that much has been written about socio-economic status very few clear cut definitions of the concept have been offered.

* This paper was read at the annual meeting of the Southwestern Sociological Society at Dallas, Texas, April 7-8, 1939.

¹ That no one has attempted to construct and standardize a scale for the measurement of the socio-economic status of rural farm families is surprising in light of the success that has attended the efforts of urban workers in this field. See especially F. S. Chapin, *The Measurement of Social Status*, The University of Minnesota Press, 1933, and M. V. Sims, *The Measurement of Socio-Economic Status*, Public School Publishing Company, Bloomington, Illinois, 1928.

² A detailed report of the study has been published as technical bulletin No. 9 of the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station under the title: *The Construction and Standardization of a Scale for the Measurement of the Socio-Economic Status of Oklahoma Farm Families*.

Probably the most widely accepted definition and certainly the one most suited to objective testing is that proposed by F. Stuart Chapin. It is that "socio-economic status is the position that an individual or family occupies with reference to the prevailing standards of cultural possessions, effective income, material possessions, and participation in the group activities of the community."³ Thus, four major components of socio-economic status each of which can be measured objectively are hypothesized. These are: Cultural Possessions; Effective Income; Material Possessions; and, Participation in the Group Activities of the Community.

THE PRELIMINARY SCHEDULE

Chapin's definition was accepted as the working basis for this study. A large group of items representing the various major components of socio-economic status were collected from such sources as: other scales; studies of socio-economic status; housing scales and surveys; and opinions of students of rural life. Over 200 items were considered for inclusion in a preliminary schedule. These were studied by the writer and his colleagues and all items believed to be confusing, ill defined, or peculiar to a particular area were eliminated. A total of 123 items considered to be reflectors of farm family socio-economic status were retained for analysis.

These items were submitted to rural specialists in the following fields: consumption economics, rural sociology, farm management, and home economics extension. Each was asked to group the items under the components of socio-economic status that they best represented. The consensus, thus obtained, despite the fact that it was quite arbitrarily determined, was believed to represent the best available classification of the items.

The distribution of the 123 items among the components of socio-economic status may be determined from Table I. Thirty-six items, including 25 material and 11 non-material culture traits, were subsumed under Cultural Possessions. Effective Income was assigned one item, net spendable income per *amman*. Thirty-five items, including 24 housing and 11 household equipment and convenience items, were considered Material Possessions. Fifty-one items bearing on the membership, attendance, and leadership activities of the husband and wife were classified under Social Participation in Group Activities. The 123 items

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 3.

TABLE I. CRITICAL RATIOS OF THE PERCENTAGE DIFFERENCES IN OCCURRENCE OF ITEMS IN SUCCESSIVE AND EXTREME QUANTILES OF THE ENTIRE POPULATION

Item Description	Quantiles 1 and 2	Quantiles 2 and 3	Quantiles 3 and 4	Quantiles 1 and 4
<i>I—Material Possessions</i>				
1. Lawn.....	3.60	0.64	4.32	8.68
2. Flower garden.....	4.90	2.32	1.72	8.46
*3. Construction of house.....	7.00	5.09	4.84	21.49
*4. Central heating.....	0.00	1.43	5.39	5.96
5. Water piped into house.....	2.08	2.10	2.58	6.00
*6. Light facilities.....	3.10	4.04	8.64	17.04
7. Indoor toilet.....	0.00	0.00	4.52	4.52
*8. Sewage disposal.....	0.00	0.71	4.07	4.52
9. Separate dining room.....	2.36	2.43	8.13	13.78
10. Separate living room.....	5.51	4.92	7.91	24.14
11. Separate kitchen.....	2.85	2.91	7.39	14.42
12. Bath.....	1.45	2.11	4.87	7.14
*13. Rooms per person ratio.....	3.69	4.51	4.72	14.73
14. Screens.....	10.58	3.90	1.67	19.21
15. Living room floor finished.....	3.37	3.60	6.58	13.44
*16. Living room wall construction.....	9.21	5.42	3.73	23.07
*17. Living room walls decorated.....	8.59	6.19	3.67	24.06
18. Living room woodwork finished.....	9.42	6.98	4.15	29.60
19. Two or more windows in living room.....	5.93	1.45	-0.44	6.76
20. Closet off living room.....	0.82	1.16	0.68	2.45
21. Telephone.....	2.85	5.59	7.50	17.29
22. Power washing machine.....	4.58	4.68	6.37	17.29
*23. Refrigerator.....	7.82	2.18	7.48	22.05
24. Kitchen cabinet.....	7.41	1.14	1.78	10.08
25. Pressure cooker.....	5.59	0.97	3.37	10.51
26. Kitchen sink.....	3.45	3.99	3.52	9.85
27. Running water in kitchen.....	-0.71	2.86	3.48	5.19
28. Linoleum on kitchen floor.....	9.81	5.64	4.08	27.27
*29. Kitchen range.....	0.54	2.85	6.30	9.40
*30. Iron.....	1.16	5.44	7.32	14.50
31. Sweeper.....	0.00	1.43	2.85	3.61
32. Sewing machine.....	6.16	2.60	0.64	9.45
33. Dining room set.....	0.00	5.57	6.03	11.89
*34. Insurable value of dwelling.....	6.50	9.14	3.87	26.32
35. Other real estate.....	0.32	1.44	2.38	4.04
<i>II—Cultural Possessions</i>				
*36. Living room windows decorated.....	8.26	6.17	4.11	24.68
*37. Living room rug.....	3.11	2.89	6.75	14.14
38. Living room armchair.....	2.02	7.48	1.82	13.77
*39. Living room lounge.....	5.38	4.15	7.71	20.75
40. Living room set.....	1.80	3.54	7.31	12.04
41. No alarm clock in living room.....	0.46	0.29	3.00	3.74
42. Other clock in living room.....	2.13	1.26	3.02	6.47
43. Pictures on living room wall.....	5.25	0.83	3.24	9.73
44. Less than two calendars in living room.....	-1.48	2.24	2.60	4.53
45. Sofa pillows in living room.....	2.08	1.54	5.47	8.83
46. Occasional table in living room.....	2.05	1.21	1.84	5.20
47. Library table in living room.....	4.11	0.12	3.02	7.27
48. Personal-social desk in living room.....	0.82	1.67	2.13	4.30
49. Foot stool in living room.....	0.71	1.44	2.58	4.25
50. Piano bench in living room.....	0.71	1.80	4.37	5.96
51. Magazine rack in living room.....	0.14	3.96	3.89	7.65
52. Book case.....	1.91	1.91	2.40	5.58

TABLE I—Continued

Item Description		Quartiles 1 and 2	Quartiles 2 and 3	Quartiles 3 and 4	Quartiles 1 and 4
53.	Radio.....	3.46	4.99	3.74	13.52
54.	Piano.....	1.44	3.48	7.06	9.70
55.	Other musical instruments.....	1.68	1.69	0.72	4.12
*56.	Books.....	5.33	5.18	3.93	17.02
57.	Hired help in home.....	1.23	0.87	4.07	5.58
58.	Insurance on furniture.....	2.50	3.73	8.02	13.43
59.	Extension course.....	0.71	0.00	0.50	1.43
60.	Weekly newspaper.....	4.54	0.34	2.43	7.47
61.	Daily newspaper.....	7.60	4.32	6.03	23.68
*62.	Magazines.....	6.08	4.10	4.16	16.96
63.	Husband's life insured.....	3.28	2.84	6.37	12.97
64.	Wife's life insured.....	1.23	2.43	4.25	7.05
65.	No relief in year.....	4.38	2.76	4.65	12.09
66.	Automobile other than truck.....	6.20	5.60	4.61	19.77
*67.	Husband's education.....	2.44	4.12	2.54	9.50
*68.	Wife's education.....	3.82	4.24	2.66	11.50
69.	Vacation in past year.....	1.54	2.54	3.85	8.02
70.	Husband plays musical instrument.....	0.00	0.25	2.42	2.62
71.	Wife plays musical instrument.....	1.04	2.65	2.94	6.47
<i>III—Effective Income</i>					
*72.	Net spendable income per annum.....	5.65	6.75	6.30	25.98
<i>IV—Social Participation</i>					
HUSBAND:					
73.	Church member.....	3.80	2.42	4.49	11.72
74.	Attends church.....	2.83	2.21	2.82	8.22
75.	Church officer.....	0.78	1.49	4.14	6.10
76.	Sunday school member.....	3.81	3.98	4.67	13.57
77.	Attends Sunday school.....	3.20	4.09	4.57	12.73
78.	Sunday school officer.....	2.50	1.18	3.90	6.75
79.	Other church group member.....	1.50	1.67	3.42	5.80
80.	Attends other church group.....	1.43	2.11	3.67	5.96
81.	Other church group officer.....	0.71	0.00	2.23	2.86
82.	Educational group member.....	1.23	0.00	1.78	2.72
83.	Attends educational group.....	0.82	0.36	1.67	2.71
84.	Educational group officer.....	1.43	0.41	-0.41	1.43
85.	Cooperative member.....	2.58	2.34	3.96	8.00
86.	Attends cooperative.....	0.00	1.23	4.57	5.31
87.	Cooperative officer.....	0.00	0.00	1.50	1.50
88.	Other economic group member.....	1.43	1.92	4.44	6.48
89.	Attends other economic group.....	1.43	0.82	3.80	5.09
90.	Other economic group officer.....	0.00	0.00	2.08	2.08
91.	Lodge member.....	0.01	2.43	3.01	5.20
92.	Attends lodge.....	-0.42	1.91	2.82	4.02
93.	Lodge officer.....	-1.43	1.50	1.45	1.91
94.	Patriotic group member.....	0.50	0.41	1.67	2.41
95.	Attends patriotic group.....	-0.71	1.50	0.36	1.23
96.	Patriotic group officer.....	0.00	0.00	0.71	0.71
97.	Recreational group member.....	0.71	1.17	2.89	4.52
98.	Attends recreational group.....	0.00	2.00	2.84	4.26
99.	Recreational group officer.....	0.00	0.00	2.50	2.50
WIFE:					
100.	Church member.....	5.09	3.14	3.96	13.68
101.	Attends church.....	3.13	3.42	2.86	9.98
102.	Church officer.....	1.23	1.78	3.48	5.77
103.	Sunday school member.....	3.90	5.51	5.22	16.73
104.	Attends Sunday school.....	3.27	5.49	4.43	14.97

TABLE I—Continued

Quartiles 1 and 4	Item Description	Quartiles 1 and 2	Quartiles 2 and 3	Quartiles 3 and 4	Quartiles 1 and 4
13.52	105. Sunday school officer.....	1.23	3.17	3.41	6.91
9.70	106. Other church group member.....	1.50	2.67	5.17	8.23
4.12	107. Attends other church group.....	1.43	2.85	5.11	8.13
17.02	108. Other church group officer.....	0.00	1.50	2.84	4.00
5.58	109. Agricultural extension group member.....	2.58	2.34	3.96	8.00
13.43	110. Attends agricultural extension group.....	1.44	2.79	3.80	7.21
1.43	111. Agricultural extension group officer.....	0.71	0.82	2.43	3.61
7.47	112. Lodge member.....	0.00	1.50	2.28	3.53
23.68	113. Attends lodge.....	0.00	1.50	1.94	3.33
16.96	114. Lodge officer.....	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00
12.97	115. Other organized group member.....	1.50	0.96	2.58	4.50
7.05	116. Attends other organized group.....	1.50	0.64	2.79	4.50
12.09	117. Other organized group officer.....	0.00	0.00	2.08	2.08
19.77	118. Recreational group member.....	1.43	0.41	0.96	2.50
9.50	119. Attends recreational group.....	1.43	0.41	0.96	2.50
11.50	120. Recreational group officer.....
8.02	121. Economic group member.....
2.62	122. Attends economic group.....
6.47	123. Economic group officer.....

*Figures for these graduated response items refer to the descriptions carrying credit for possession. For descriptions see Appendix A of the detailed report.

included 60 material and 63 non-material culture traits. In all, 24 required graduated and 99 non-graduated responses. No rating questions were included. These items were combined into a survey schedule with other pertinent questions.⁴ Data concerning them were gathered by means of a field survey during the winter of 1937-1938.

THE SAMPLE

The sample used in the construction of the scale consisted of 800 unbroken white families living in the open country areas of Haskell, Cotton, and Major counties. These counties were selected to represent Oklahoma as a whole and, insofar as possible, other rural areas on the basis of the following criteria: percentage of farm tenancy; rural farm plane of living; and type of farming. The schedules were taken in as random a manner as possible in every township of each county studied. Comparisons of median size of family and tenure classification between the sample and the separate counties and the State as a whole showed that the sample closely represents these populations.

PROCEDURE FOR ITEM ANALYSIS

Having collected the data the next problem was to select from the total group of items a relatively small number possessing the ability

⁴The data for this study were gathered along with data for a study that the writer is making of the social correlatives of farm tenure status.

to differentiate validly between farm families of different socio-economic status. Among the several methods available for determining the validity of items the one best suited for the purposes of this study was the method of internal consistency or critical ratio method.⁵ This method may be employed in studies such as the present one where no satisfactory external criterion of the variable being measured is available. It hypothesizes that the best criterion is the measurement produced by the total group of items in the preliminary scale. Thus items that best measure what the scale as a whole measures are said to be valid items. It presumes to select items that measure a single common factor as shown by the ability of the items to differentiate between extremes of a distribution based on total scores.⁶

The application of the criterion of internal consistency to the data of this study involved the following steps:⁷ (1) Each preliminary schedule was scored by summing the total number of items possessed. (2) On the basis of this preliminary score, the 800 schedules were divided into fourths. The first quartile contained the 200 lowest scoring schedules; the second, the next highest 200; the third, the next highest 200; and the fourth, the 200 highest. (3) The percentage frequency of occurrence of each of the 123 items in each quartile was computed. For example the item "separate living room" appeared in 5.5, 25.0, 48.0, and 82.5 percent of the schedules in quartiles 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. (4) The percentage difference of the occurrence of each item between the successive and the extreme quartiles was computed. For the above item these figures were 19.5, 23.0, 34.5, and 77.0. (5) The statistical significance of these percentage differences was determined by relating each difference to its standard error. This ratio is known as the critical ratio.⁸ When the critical ratio is 2 (the difference is 2

⁵ For an excellent discussion of validation of test items see J. H. Long and P. Sandiford *The Validation of Test Items*, Department of Educational Research Bulletin 3, University of Toronto Press, 1935.

⁶ Recently evidence has been presented to demonstrate that a scale composed of items selected by this technique does not necessarily measure a single common factor. C. I. Mosier, "A Note on Item Analysis and The Criterion of Internal Consistency," *Psychometrika*, 1:275-282 (1936) and, R. F. Sletto, *The Construction of Personality Scales by the Criterion of Internal Consistency*, Sociological Press, Hanover, New Hampshire, 1937. However, the evidence of the present study indicates that the indexes of the scale measure a single general factor. See Appendix F, of the detailed report of this study.

⁷ The procedure used in this study was based on A. M. Leahy, *The Measurement of Urban Home Environment*, University of Minnesota Press, 1936, pp. 27-34.

⁸ This is the same as the t-value. See R. A. Fisher, *Statistical Methods for Research Workers* (5th edition) Oliver and Boyd Ltd., London, 1934, pp. 112-159. The formula

times as great as its standard error) it is customary to say the difference is "significant," i.e., the probabilities of exceeding the critical ratio in a positive direction due to chance factors alone are small enough (23 in 1,000) that it is safe to accept the difference as a true difference. If the critical ratio is 3 or greater the difference is said to be "highly significant" since in only very rare cases (1 in 1,000) could this value have been exceeded in a positive direction due to chance factors alone.⁹ The critical ratios were computed for each of the percentage difference figures and are shown in Table I.¹⁰ For the example above the critical ratios were 5.51, 4.92, 7.91, and 24.14. This indicates that each difference is significant and further indicates that the item possesses the ability to differentiate between the various levels of socio-economic status. In other words it is a valid item.

THE SELECTION OF ITEMS

The standard set for item retention was that each item should possess critical ratios of 2 or greater for each of the comparisons.¹¹ Thus only items possessing the capacity to differentiate consistently between successive levels of socio-economic status were considered suitable for use in the final scale.

When this standard was applied to the 123 items in the experimental scale 82 items were eliminated. In addition five items that met the standard were dropped for practical reasons. "Insurable value of dwelling" was omitted since it is largely dependent upon the judgment of the interviewer and thus is subject to considerable unreliability. "No relief in 1937" was eliminated when it was learned that dependable replies to this question could not be obtained. "Husband is member of Sunday School" and the same question for the wife were dropped because of the wide variation in the definition of membership in Sunday School from denomination to denomination. Finally, "net spendable income per *amman*" was eliminated because of the difficulty in deter-

for the critical ratio is $\text{Difference} / \sigma \text{ difference}$. The formula for the σ difference between percentages is $\sqrt{\sigma p_1^2 + \sigma p_2^2}$. The standard error of the percentages may be read from a table prepared by H. A. Edgerton and D. G. Paterson. See "Table of Standard Errors and Probable Errors of Percentages for Varying Numbers of Cases," *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 10:378-91 (1926).

⁹ For further elaboration see Fisher, *op. cit.*, p. 117-118.

¹⁰ Due to lack of space only the critical ratios are shown. However, all computations are available in the detailed report of the study.

¹¹ This standard is somewhat higher than is usually set. Leahy selected items on the basis of critical ratios of 2 or greater for three out of five comparisons. *Op. cit.*, p. 34.

mining this figure accurately without a detailed study of the farm business. This left a total of 36 items: 13 in the Cultural Possessions Index; 15 in the Material Possessions Index; and 8 in the Social Participation Index. Of these items 19 possessed critical ratios of 3 or greater for every comparison.

Weights were computed for the various descriptions of the items by use of the sigma method of scoring and the 36 items were combined into the scale shown below.¹²

THE FARM FAMILY SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS SCALE†

No. _____ Date _____ Scale Score _____

Interviewer _____

General Information

Name of family _____

Post office address _____ R.F.D. No. _____

County _____ State _____ Tenure Status _____

Race _____ Number of persons living in the house _____

SCALE ITEMS

SCORE

SCORE IF Y N

_____ 1. Construction of house:									
	Brick, stucco, etc., or painted frame		Unpainted frame or other						
Score:	5		3						
_____ 2. Room-person ratio:									
	Number of rooms?— ÷ Number of persons?— = ———								
Ratio:	Below 1.00	1.00-1.99	2.00-2.99	3.00 and up					
Score:	3	5	7	9					
_____ 3. Separate dining room?	Y—N							6	3
_____ 4. Separate kitchen?	Y—N							6	3
_____ 5. Separate living room?	Y—N							6	3
_____ *6. Living room floors finished?	Y—N							7	4
_____ *7. Living room woodwork finished?	Y—N							5	2
_____ *8. Living room wall construction:									
	Plaster	Wall Board	Ceiling	Building paper or no inside wall					
Score:	6	5	4	2					
_____ *9. Living room walls decorated?	N—Y							5	2
_____ *10. Living room floor covering:				Linoleum or bare floors					
	Rugs or carpets								
Score:	6			3					
_____ *11. Blinds and curtains or drapes on living windows?	Y—N							5	2
_____ *12. Living room lounge:									
	Divan, davenport, or studio couch	Day bed or couch	Bed, cot, or none						
Score:	6	5	3						

¹² For a discussion of sigma scoring see A. M. Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 41-42.

— 13. Lighting facilities:

Score:	Electric 8	Gas, mantel, or pressure 6	Oil lamps, other or none 3	
— 14. Water piped into house?	Y—N			8 4
— 15. Kitchen sink?	Y—N			7 4
— 16. Linoleum on kitchen floor?	Y—N			5 2
— 17. Power washer?	Y—N			6 3

— 18. Refrigerator:

Score:	Mechanical 8	Ice 6	Other or none 3	
— 19. Radio?	Y—N			6 3
— 20. Telephone?	Y—N			6 3
— 21. Automobile? (other than truck)	Y—N			5 2
— 22. Furniture insured?	Y—N			7 4
— 23. Family takes a daily newspaper?	Y—N			6 3

— 24. Number of magazines regularly taken? _____

Number: 0-1 2-3 4-5 6 and up

Score: 3 5 7 8

— 25. Approximate number of books in the home? _____

Number: 0-7 8-49 50-99 100 and up

Score: 2 5 7 8

— 26. Wife's education? (grades completed) _____

Number: 0-7 8 9-11 12 13 and up

Score: 2 4 6 7 8

— 27. Husband's education? (grades completed) _____

Number: 0-7 8 9-11 12 13 and up

Score: 3 5 6 7 8

— 28. Husband's life insured? Y—N 6 3

— 29. Husband a church member? Y—N 5 3

— 30. Husband attends church? (1/4 of meetings) Y—N 5 2

— 31. Husband attends Sunday school? (1/4 of meetings) Y—N 6 3

— 32. Husband a member of a farm cooperative? Y—N 8 4

— 33. Wife a church member? Y—N 5 2

— 34. Wife attends church? (1/4 of meetings) Y—N 5 2

— 35. Wife attends Sunday school (1/4 of meetings) Y—N 6 3

— 36. Wife a member of an extension or P.T.A. group? Y—N 8 4

— SCALE SCORE

‡ Detailed instructions for the use of the scale have been prepared. See Appendix H of the detailed report of the study.

* Questions 6-12 pertain to the living room only.

THE VALIDITY OF THE SCALE

In the tests of the validity of the scale two samples were used. The first consisted of 257 unbroken white farm families living in a representative Oklahoma county (Craig). These families were selected in the same manner as the families in the standardization sample. The second was composed of the 781 farm families in the construction sample for whom validation criteria were available.

In addition to scores on the farm family socio-economic status scale, scores on the following scales designed to measure socio-economic status or some closely related variable were available for the smaller sample: The Chapin Social Status Scale 1933;¹³ the Dickins' revision of this scale;¹⁴ The Clark Rural Home Equipment Scale;¹⁵ and an experimental scale consisting of 90 of the items in the experimental schedule possessing critical ratios of 3 or greater for extreme quartile comparisons. Also, the following socio-economic data were available in numerical form for both samples: cash income per *ammain*; net wealth per family; family expenditures per *ammain*; and total money value of living per *ammain*.¹⁶

The major test of the validity of the scale was made by correlating the socio-economic status scale scores with the above criteria for the families in the standardization samples. When this was done the results shown below were obtained.

For the 257 Oklahoma farm families

Status Scale and Chapin's S.S.S., 1933	0.80
Status Scale and Dickins' revision of S.S.S., 1933	0.82
Status Scale and Clark's Rural Home Equipment Scale	0.71
Status Scale and Experimental Scale	0.97
Status Scale and Cash income per <i>ammain</i>	0.37
Status Scale and Net wealth per family	0.57
Status Scale and Family expenditures per <i>ammain</i>	0.52
Status Scale and Total money value of living per <i>ammain</i>	0.51

For the 781 Oklahoma farm families

Status Scale and Cash income per <i>ammain</i>	0.63
Status Scale and Net wealth per family	0.55
Status Scale and Family expenditures per <i>ammain</i>	0.63
Status Scale and Total money value of living per <i>ammain</i>	0.67

¹³ F. S. Chapin, *The Measurement of Social Status*, The University of Minnesota Press, 1933.

¹⁴ Dorothy Dickins, *Family Living on Poorer and Better Soil*, Mississippi Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 320, State College, Mississippi, 1937, and "Living Rooms of White and Negro Families of Mississippi, Spending \$500 and Less a Year for Family Living," *Journal of Home Economics*, 29:702-709 (December, 1937).

¹⁵ Caroll D. Clark, "Evaluating Certain Equipment of the Modern Rural Home" *Journal of Home Economics*, 22:1005-15 (December, 1930).

¹⁶ These data were calculated from actual income, wealth and expenditure figures taken from the social correlatives of farm tenure status study. For a discussion of the exact meaning of these terms see F. M. Williams and C. C. Zimmerman, *Studies of Farm Family Living in the United States and Other Countries*, U.S.D.A., Miscellaneous Publication 223, 1935, pp. 3-6.

These validity coefficients are all highly significant¹⁷ and are indicative of the close general relationship between the socio-economic status scale scores and these various independent criteria of socio-economic status. The relationship between each of the four scales designed to measure socio-economic status and the present scale is very close. In terms of these scales the scale may be said to possess high validity. The coefficients of the scale with the four remaining criteria are not as high as those with the socio-economic status scale. However, these coefficients all indicate a sufficiently close relationship to be accepted as additional evidence of the validity of the scale.

One further test of the validity of the scale was made by computing a multiple correlation, based on the standardization sample composed of 257 families, using the scale score as the dependent variable and the Chapin scale score, the Clark scale score, and the total money value of living per *ammain* as independent variables. The resulting coefficient was 0.83. This is a highly significant coefficient and since it is relatively high it may be interpreted as an additional indication of validity of the scale.

Since each of the validity tests indicated a close general relationship between socio-economic status as measured by the scale and several other criteria of the same variable it was concluded that the scale measures the socio-economic status of farm families in a satisfactory manner.¹⁸ It is therefore a valid scale.

THE RELIABILITY OF THE SCALE

Three tests of the reliability of the scale were made. First, the split-half reliability coefficient was computed for the standardization samples. This proved to be 0.83, and 0.86 for the 257 and the 781 families, respectively. When corrected by the Spearman-Brown formula they became 0.91 and 0.92. Second, the test-retest reliability coefficient based on 40 families was computed. This was 0.90. Third, the reliability coefficient based on the scores assigned simultaneously by two investi-

¹⁷ When the term "highly significant" is used it means that the correlation coefficient exceeds the one percent level of significance. All coefficients in this study were tested using Fisher's test for correlation coefficients, *op. cit.*, Table V.A.

¹⁸ In a practical test based on 1,190 Oklahoma farm families the scale has demonstrated its ability to differentiate significantly between tenure classes usually considered to occupy different socio-economic levels. This may be accepted as further evidence of the validity of the scale.

gators working independently of each other to a group of 60 families was computed. This was 0.99. Since all of the reliability coefficients exceed the customary standard for reliability (0.80) it was concluded that the scale measures the socio-economic status of farm families in a consistent manner. Therefore, it is a reliable measuring instrument.

THE USEFULNESS OF THE SCALE

Since the scale has been shown to possess satisfactory validity and reliability its use may be recommended in situations where a quantitative description of the socio-economic status of farm families is necessary.¹⁹ This description should prove more exact and more easily obtainable than any reliable estimate gained by techniques now available. The scale may not be thought of as a substitute for budget studies where these data are employed to determine the nature of consumption habits. However, it may be used in all situations where budget study is usually employed for the purpose of ascertaining the socio-economic status of farm families. It should prove especially valuable in researches where the relationships between several measurable variables are being studied. In experimental studies it may be used to control the socio-economic status variable. Also, it will be useful in many sampling problems. Further, it should prove of value in rural social engineering since it furnishes an easily obtainable measurement of a variable that is important in many of the diverse problems faced by social workers, educators, extension workers, and social planners.

PROBLEMS DEMANDING FURTHER STUDY

The construction and standardization of the scale by no means solves permanently the problem of the measurement of farm family socio-economic status. Several problems demanding further study are already apparent. These include: the standardization of the scale in other areas;²⁰ the determination of the value of the scale for application on broken families;²¹ Negro and other racial groups, and village families;

¹⁹ The conclusions regarding the validity and reliability of the scale are for the Oklahoma population. However, there is good reason to believe that the scale will work well in other areas since the samples on which it was constructed and standardized included all levels of socio-economic status.

²⁰ Since the scale is being used in a cooperative research project of the Midwestern Sociological Society, evidence concerning this problem will soon be available.

²¹ Evidence based on 152 Oklahoma broken farm families indicates that the scale may be applied to broken families. See Appendix G of the detailed report of the study.

the reduction of the length of the scale;²² the factor analysis of the scale;²³ and the revision of the scale from time to time to meet changes in the rural culture. It is hoped that other workers will give attention to these and other problems that grow out of their experience with the scale.

²² Preliminary evidence seems to indicate that insofar as the Oklahoma population is concerned the social participation questions may be omitted without sacrifice in validity or reliability of the scale. See *ibid*, Appendix E.

²³ The tetrad difference test based on 1,038 Oklahoma farm families indicates that the indexes of the scale measure a single common factor. See *ibid*, Appendix F.

Brazil as a Competitor in World Cotton Trade

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The recent expansion of the cotton industry in Brazil is associated closely with coffee production. Because of the well-known crisis in the coffee industry, brought on by an over-supply, followed by low prices, the Brazilian government placed restrictions on the planting of coffee trees. The result was that many farmers turned to cotton as a cash crop on land which otherwise would have been planted to coffee.

Brazil now is an important producer of cotton. For the 25 years prior to 1932, production remained at 400,000 to 500,000 bales.¹ In 1935, production reached one and three-quarter million bales; in 1936, it was 1,824,000; and in 1937, 2 million bales.² With this increase in production has come an increase in exports, and Brazil now is one of the world's largest exporters of raw cotton. (See Table, below). From 1928 to 1932, the average export of cotton from Brazil was 102,000 bales.³ From 1934 to 1938, the average export was 1,000,000 bales.⁴ In certain foreign countries, Brazil, partly through the barter system, very largely has replaced the United States as a source of cotton, and so has become a real competitor of this country in the cotton export market.

EXPORT OF RAW COTTON⁵
(thousands of bales)

Country	1934-35	1935-36	1936-37	1937-38	1938-39
United States.....	4,816	6,040	5,511	5,672	3,353
Brazil.....	746	743	1,082	1,146	1,609
World Total.....	11,159	13,438	14,250	12,533	11,629

¹ *Agricultural Statistics*, United States Department of Agriculture.

² *Cotton Trade Journal*, International Edition, 1939-40, p. 16.

³ Norris, P. K., *Cotton Production in Southern Brazil*, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A., 1935, p. 18.

⁴ *Cotton Trade Journal*, International Edition, 1939-40, p. 20.

⁵ *Cotton Trade Journal*, International Edition, 1939-40, p. 20.

There are two important cotton-producing sections of Brazil: the northeastern states and the southern states. Cotton growing is an old industry in northeastern Brazil and until 1933 this area was by far the most important cotton producer of the country. For several reasons, however, production has not increased as rapidly as in southern Brazil. One is that for many years farmers have been growing tree cotton (the dominant variety) much as orchards, mostly on small rented acreages. The trees bear for several years thus making it difficult to improve the quality of the crop or even to prevent deterioration through indiscriminate mixing. Much of the ginning equipment is obsolete, which adds to the difficulty in turning out a product which compares favorably with the cotton of southern Brazil. Some of the unmixed tree cotton has a long staple and brings a premium price on the market. The hot, enervating climate makes the people less alert and less interested in embarking upon a program of crop improvement. It is easier to continue raising the same crops in the same way than it is to supply the demand of an exacting market.

Along the coast where population is dense, cotton meets the competition of other crops such as tobacco, sugar, and fruit. Inland on the plateau the land is semi-arid and frequently suffers severe drought which lowers the quality of the crop and reduces the yield.

At least one other factor has served as an obstacle to increasing the production of cotton. Several states have a tax on the interstate movement of this commodity. This has been a severe handicap to the cotton industry because northeastern Brazil is divided into several small states and often cotton is taxed more than once in moving from the point of origin to its destination. In spite of these obstacles, both nature-made and man-made, cotton production has shown some increase, but has not kept pace with the neighboring states to the south.

Since 1933, production has increased in the southern states until now they are producing more than one-half the total for the country. It is this area which seems to hold the greater promise for increased output in the future. Southern Brazil has an enormous area of land suitable for cotton production. The four cotton-producing states (São Paulo, Minas Geraes, Parana, and Rio de Janeiro) have an area about equal to that of Texas, Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana combined. Most of this land has never been cleared and is not included in farms. In addition to this acreage as yet unused, the recent government restrictions on the planting of coffee and sugar have made available for cotton

much land now in farms and already cleared. In 1934, southern Brazil had less than one-half of one per cent of its area in cotton. It has been estimated that this section of Brazil could increase its acreage by sixteen times that amount.⁶

The fact that the average yield of lint per acre for a recent ten-year period was 182 pounds in southern Brazil is sufficient proof that the land will grow cotton and that the climate is at least reasonably satisfactory for the crop.⁷ The southern states have a general elevation of 2,500 feet and because of this elevation the heat is not as oppressive as might be inferred from its latitude. Frost damage occurs occasionally, but in most years the growing season is sufficiently long for the crop to give its maximum yield. The relatively high elevation with its resulting cooler weather presents an invigorating environment for the workers, and laborers are somewhat more ambitious here than in the north.

The quality of cotton a country is able to put on the market is almost as important as the quantity. Brazil has recognized this and has taken definite and constructive steps toward a program to improve and regulate the quality of her cotton. The bulk of the cotton of southern Brazil is grown from Texas seed, but the government is engaged in an improvement program designed to develop a strain better adapted to local conditions. Seed of a superior quality are made available to farmers at a price not much above that of the market price for ordinary seed. Control is exercised over the cotton after harvest through a system of inspecting and licensing gins. This has helped to prevent the operating of poorly equipped plants and by this means it is expected that a product of uniformly high quality can be placed on the market. Some of the gins and oil mills are operated by concerns from the United States, and those in charge have the advantage of understanding the problems associated with the production of cotton and of the care necessary to process and handle a high grade product. One measure of their success is the increased sales of Brazilian cotton in world markets at a price which compares favorably with the average price paid for American cotton.

The agricultural labor supply of southern Brazil meets the present demand relatively well. It is principally of Portuguese extraction with some mixture of Indian and Negro. The agricultural possibilities of the area have attracted a number of colonizing groups, chiefly Japanese,

⁶ Norris, P. K., *Cotton Production in Southern Brazil*, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, U.S.D.A., 1935, p. 2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Germans, and Italians, and some of these have given much attention to the production of cotton. It was estimated by the office of the Japanese consul that 175,000 bales were produced by Japanese labor in one state alone in 1934.⁸

The eastern portion of southern Brazil is served by the best net of railway lines in the country and the other means of transportation and communication are correspondingly well-developed, although the systems are not as efficient and widespread as those of the Cotton Belt in the United States. The region seems ready, economically, for the development of a cotton industry which already has made good headway in many localities in recent years. In the city of Marilia, founded less than 12 years ago, the gins turned out 82,000 bales of cotton in 1938.⁹

In spite of the heavy influx of foreign agricultural workers before restrictive measures were taken by the government, large areas of southern Brazil remain undeveloped agriculturally. But labor shortage should not retard production permanently, because the use of machinery, now rather limited, could be made more widespread to increase the effectiveness of available labor, and Brazil again could encourage immigration from Asiatic or European sources.

The production of cotton in Brazil in recent years has been great enough to be of concern to the American growers, and it appears that output there may well continue to increase if there is sufficient financial inducement. Cotton, the new crop of southern Brazil, is competing with coffee, the old crop, and is accepted almost with equal favor. Most of the rapid expansion in cotton acreage is taking place in the principal coffee-growing areas, and there is a definite tendency for an increased cotton acreage following those years when the price of cotton has been high relative to coffee prices. Some of the Brazilians are pulling up coffee trees and planting cotton.

The implications, as far as the United States is concerned, are clear. Any attempt on the part of this country to raise the world price of cotton will serve as a further inducement to increase output in Brazil. When production gets well under way in Brazil, and when gins, oil mills, and marketing facilities are established, that country will not relinquish freely any ground it may have gained in the world markets. The extent to which the United States curtails its cotton production may represent the portion of the world market which this country has lost permanently to Brazil and to other competitors.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

⁹ Evans, S. C., *Farm and Ranch*, 1939, p. 4.

Non-Uniformity of State Motor Vehicle Laws Handicaps Interstate Transportation¹

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In 1938 there were registered in the United States 29,485,680 automobiles of all classes—approximately one to every five persons. The problem of regulating and controlling the traffic involving this tremendous number of vehicles to provide maximum safety conditions for all highway users is the responsibility of the states and local units of government.

Since the beginning of automobile travel, there has been developed a great mass of laws and regulations pertaining to the operation of motor vehicles. In the early years, poor roads and mechanical imperfections of automobiles limited motor travel to relatively short distances, and motorists of one state were not particularly concerned about the laws and regulations of other states. With the improvement of automobile performance and the development of a nation-wide system of paved highways, distance has ceased to be of importance as a limiting factor in automobile travel. Cross-country automobile trips for pleasure or on business have become common. A considerable part of the goods involved in interstate trade is transported over our highways by motor carriers. With these developments there has come a consciousness of the amazing lack of uniformity of motor vehicle laws among the states, and of the urgent need for cooperation in correcting the chaotic condition in which motor transportation finds itself as a result of this lack of uniformity of laws and regulations.

The laws and regulations developed by the states for the control of motor traffic are, for the most part, measures designed to protect highways and bridges and to safeguard the persons and property of highway users in general. The effectiveness of such legislation to achieve the

¹ The data relative to requirements of state laws and regulations presented in this paper have been summarized from House Document No. 462, Part 1, 75th Congress, 3d Session, and from "Comparative Charts of State Statutes Illustrating Barriers to Trade between the States," Works Progress Administration, Washington, D. C.

objectives for which it is designed, however, is partly nullified by conflicting requirements among the states.

It is generally accepted that the manner of driving a motor vehicle becomes a habit and that the involuntary reflexes are an important factor in governing the handling and control of a vehicle by an individual. The reaction of a driver in an emergency results from his involuntary reflexes. Driving habits and involuntary reactions are largely the product of the conditions under which a driver normally drives—that is, they are developed under the laws of his state and community and the manner of their enforcement. It will be seen, then, that a person who operates his automobile carefully, legally, and naturally in the community and state where his habits of driving and involuntary reactions have been developed may be transformed into a law breaker and unsafe driver by crossing a boundary into a state having laws and regulations conflicting with those under which he is accustomed to drive.

The effect on the motor vehicle operator is not the only harmful consequence of the situation. Lack of uniformity of state laws and regulations with respect to safety devices and equipment and size and weight of vehicles acts as a burden to interstate transportation of goods by motor carrier.

SAFETY DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT

Headlights.—It is required in all states that motor vehicles be equipped with at least two headlamps, one on either side of the front of the vehicle. California, Connecticut, and Missouri specify the height above the road at which they are to be mounted. Nineteen states make provision for the color of headlamps by requiring white, amber, or yellow, and seventeen states prohibit the use of red or green lights at the front of a vehicle. Many states provide that headlights must be visible for specified distances ahead and that they must illuminate objects a certain distance away. Georgia requires that lights be visible 100 feet ahead, eight states specify 200 feet, Kansas 300 feet, and nine states specify 500 feet. Thirty-seven states require that objects must be discernible at specified distances varying from 75 feet to 200 feet. Twenty-nine states fix the maximum bulb candlepower of headlamps—Missouri at 36, twenty-five states at 32, and three states at 21. Six states have set minimum candlepower requirements—five specifying 21 and one, 10. It will be noted that the minimum of 21 candlepower fixed by five states is the same as the maximum fixed by three other states.

Rear Lights.—All states require that every motor vehicle or the last

unit of a combination of vehicles must show a lighted rear lamp during the time specified for the display of lights. Florida does not specify a color for the rear light. All other states require that this light shall be red. It shall be visible for 500 feet in 28 states, for 300 feet in Virginia, for 200 feet in two states, and for 100 feet in four states. Fourteen states require no specific distance for visibility.

Clearance Lights.—Most states require that certain types of vehicles be equipped with clearance lights to indicate their position on the road at night. Such lights are required for vehicles over 70 inches in width in three states, over 72 inches in seven states, over 76 inches in one state, over 80 inches in 14 states, and over 84 inches in four states. Four states require that all commercial vehicles be equipped with clearance lights. Twenty-nine of the states requiring clearance lights prescribe one light for the left front and one for the left rear, visible from 200 feet to the front and from 500 feet to the rear. In the remaining four states, lights are required both at the right and at the left in the front and at the rear. All states require that rear clearance lights be red, but the approved color for the front lights varies considerably, green being permitted in 15 states, white in 14 states, amber in three states, yellow in three states, and blue in one state. A number of states permit the substitution of properly colored reflectors for clearance lights.

Brakes.—Thirty-one states require that every automobile shall be equipped with two sets of independently operated brakes, so constructed that no part that is liable to failure shall be common to both. Twenty-three states specify stopping distances in which brakes shall be effective. In 22 states it is required that every trailer or semitrailer over a specified gross weight shall be equipped with adequate brakes, and fifteen of these states require that such brakes be so designed that they may be applied by the driver from the cab of the towing vehicle.

RESTRICTIONS ON MOTOR VEHICLE SIZES

Six states have no restrictions on the height of motor vehicles. The remaining states have maximum height restrictions ranging from 11 feet to 14½ feet.

In 44 states the total outside width of any vehicle or the load thereon may not exceed eight feet, in two states the maximum is 8½ feet, in one state 7½ feet, and in one state it is seven feet.

With respect to the maximum length of motor vehicles, 47 states specify limits ranging from 26½ feet to 60 feet for single vehicles. In

47 states tractor-semitrailer combinations are limited to maximum overall lengths varying from 30 feet to 85 feet. Combinations of vehicles other than tractor-semitrailers are not permitted in Alabama, Connecticut, and South Carolina. In other states, except Maryland and Massachusetts in which there is no limit, limitations on combinations of vehicles coupled together vary from 35 feet to 85 feet.

GROSS WEIGHT OF MOTOR VEHICLES

With respect to the maximum gross weight of motor vehicles used to transport goods, 37 states and the District of Columbia limit the gross weight on a single axle. These weights vary from 10,000 pounds to 24,640 pounds. One state requires that the weight on each axle must be at least 20 per cent of the gross weight, and in another state the permissible axle load varies with the size and pressure of tire used.

Forty-two states and the District of Columbia limit the gross load of a four-wheel single unit to weights ranging from 7,000 pounds to 36,000 pounds, and in six states the maximum weights are determined by formulas in which type of tires and spacing of axles are factors.

Maximum weight limits of six-wheel single unit vehicles ranging from 7,000 pounds to 44,000 pounds have been fixed by thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia, and in nine states the maximum is determined by formula.

In thirty-three states and the District of Columbia maximum weights of a combination of a four-wheel truck and a four-wheel trailer vary from 7,000 pounds to 72,000 pounds; in ten states the maximum is determined by formula; in four states such a combination is not permitted; and in one state this combination is not permitted for commercial use.

The following table presents the maximum gross weights of any permissible combination of vehicles, by states.

STATES	Maximum Gross Weight (Lbs.)
Texas	7,000*
Louisiana	14,000*
Kentucky and Tennessee	18,000
Alabama	20,000
Mississippi and South Dakota	30,000
Florida	34,000
North Dakota, Vermont, and Virginia	35,000
Wisconsin	36,000

Missouri	38,000
Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, Delaware, and Illinois	40,000
Maryland	42,000
Oklahoma	45,000
Nebraska and Wyoming	48,000
New York	50,000
Oregon	54,000
New Jersey	60,000
Georgia	61,600
Pennsylvania	62,000
Colorado and Kansas	63,000
Ohio	66,000
Arkansas	66,500
California, Idaho, and Washington	68,000
New Hampshire	69,000
Arizona	90,000
Montana	92,000
Nevada	114,000
District of Columbia	118,800
Rhode Island	120,000

* Figures for these states are net load; figures for other states apparently include weight of vehicle.

In Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, New Mexico, Utah, and West Virginia the permissible gross weight is determined by formula only.

Weight restrictions operate as a burden upon interstate motor transportation particularly when variations in permissible weights as between bordering states are wide. For example, consider the situation in Texas. Motor carriers from Texas may carry the maximum load of 7,000 pounds into any bordering state, but truckers from no state which borders Texas may enter that state with a full load. The maximum weight permitted in Louisiana is twice that of the maximum in Texas, that of Oklahoma is more than six times as great, and that of Arkansas is more than nine times as great.²

This wide variation between the maximum weight permitted in Texas and those permitted by bordering states is a burden upon Texas truckers as well as upon those of bordering states. To illustrate the consequences of this burden, suppose the operator of a motor carrier obtains the contract to transport a shipment of goods weighing 49,000 pounds from

² This comparison is not exactly correct as it applies to Oklahoma and Arkansas, since the maximum permissible weights given for these states include weight of vehicle, while those for Texas and Louisiana are for net load.

Dallas to Little Rock. It would be necessary for him to make seven trips to move the shipment from Dallas to Texarkana, from which point he could carry the entire shipment on to Little Rock in one load, provided, of course, the goods were of such nature as to make this practicable. It is obvious that the six extra trips between Dallas and Texarkana would so increase the cost that it is extremely unlikely that such shipments would be made by motor carrier. The same situation would, of course, exist in the case of a similar shipment from Little Rock to Dallas.

Not only does the extremely low maximum permissible weight in Texas penalize interstate shipment of goods by motor carrier, but it evidently adds greatly to the cost of intrastate shipping by truck. To illustrate this, a case similar to the one used before might be assumed. Suppose a trucker obtains a contract to transport a shipment of 49,000 pounds from Dallas to Houston. He would have to make seven trips to deliver this shipment. Consider, also, the motor freight lines which make regularly scheduled trips between various points in the state and maintain depots for assembling shipments. Regardless of the nature and number of shipments accumulated at any point, the amount that may be transported by one carrier is limited to 7,000 pounds.

It is not here proposed to say what would be a reasonable maximum weight limit for motor carriers. This can only be determined by a thorough study of all factors having a bearing upon such a limitation. It is clear, however, that there can be no logical basis for weight restrictions which vary from 7,000 pounds in Texas to 120,000 pounds in Rhode Island—a variation between these extremes of 113,000 pounds. If it be assumed that 40,000 pounds (the maximum set in eight states) is a reasonable limit, then the weight restriction in Texas is some 33,000 pounds too low. The Texas law apparently is designed to discourage the use of motor transportation except for local hauling. An interesting feature of the law is that in the case of a vehicle transporting property to or from the nearest practicable common carrier, or where the point of destination is less distant from the point of origin than the nearest practicable common carrier, the maximum permissible weight is raised from 7,000 pounds to 14,000 pounds.

From this brief review it will be seen that legislation pertaining to the regulation of motor traffic has by no means kept pace with mechanical progress in the manufacture of automobiles and with the development of highways. In fact, it has lagged so far behind that the

states are faced with the necessity of coordinating their laws and regulations or the prospect of relinquishing authority over transportation to the Federal Government. As a matter of fact, the Interstate Commerce Commission already has issued regulations which set up uniform safety and equipment standards for interstate carriers. Apparently motor vehicle legislation has been enacted by each state without regard to its effect on other states. Judging from the situation with respect to such legislation, as well as other legislation involving interstate relationships, the time has come when each state as a component part of the Union must cooperate with all other parts for the benefit of the whole.

It would seem that the logical way to approach the problem of bringing order into the situation among the states with respect to the regulation of motor traffic would be for some organization such as the Council of State Governments to develop model laws and regulations which might be submitted to the states for adoption with only such modifications as are made absolutely necessary by variations in conditions as between states. That some such method as this would be practical has been demonstrated by the fact that a number of states have adopted the regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission setting up safety and equipment standards for interstate carriers.

The Conflict Between the Federal Commerce Power and the Taxing Power of the States

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An article by Mr. Wendell L. Willkie, appearing in a recent issue of *The Saturday Evening Post*,¹ states that the present Supreme Court, consisting of a majority of justices appointed by President Roosevelt, is in the process of revolutionizing established principles of constitutional law and overthrowing reliable precedents built up through the long course of years. Among the principles which Mr. Willkie points out as being particularly revolutionized are those pertaining to the interpretation of the commerce clause.

Mr. Willkie would have you believe, from his broad general statements and hand-picked illustrations, that the interpretation of the commerce clause was regular and consistent until the present personnel of the Court was appointed. He neglects to call to attention the fact that there have been frequent disagreements on the Court concerning interpretations; that there have been several sharp turns and departures from previously accepted doctrine; and that there have been reversals and changes in viewpoints with nearly every change in personnel on the Court.

Mr. Willkie particularly regrets the extension of the federal commerce power over subjects which were formerly considered to be only local acts or occupations. Strangely enough, not many years ago, those same interests for which Mr. Willkie speaks were clamoring to be recognized as subjects of interstate commerce, in order to escape the taxing power of the states. That was before Congress had exercised to any great extent its authority to regulate commerce, and the Court had ruled that the silence of Congress was tantamount to a command that commerce should be free.²

¹ *The Saturday Evening Post*, March 9, 1940.

² Willkie states that the present court is "distinctly unsympathetic" in its attitude "toward local autonomy, states' rights and many established principles"; yet this court is doing a great deal to reestablish the most fundamental basis of states' rights—the power of the states to tax and raise revenue to perform their functions. Mr. Justice Black, whom

The conflict between the federal commerce clause and the taxing power of the states began early in our history. In many cases the question was so closely allied with state regulation of interstate commerce as to be inseparable. Chief Justice Marshall set the stage for the dispute, and, with his customary love for sweeping generalities and broad doctrines, paved the way for a great deal of the confusion which has since appeared in that field.

Marshall presented the thesis of nationalism. In *Gibbons v. Ogden*³ and *Brown v. Maryland*,⁴ he defined a broad commerce power of the national government; and although not definitely standing on the principle in either of those cases, he hinted at the theory that the granting of the commerce power to Congress automatically excluded the states from that field. Marshall himself showed that he did not fully accept the principle of the exclusiveness of the commerce power, for in his last case concerning the interpretation of the commerce clause he allowed state regulation in the absence of congressional action.⁵

Taney stated the antithesis to Marshall's thesis of nationalism. He never questioned the power of Congress to regulate commerce among the states, but he refused to accept the principle of the exclusiveness of the commerce power in the absence of congressional legislation.⁶ Taney defended the right of the states to tax or regulate interstate commerce if there was no conflict with an act of Congress.

Out of this clash of opinions of the two great Chief Justices, a new synthesis was created, conciliating the opposing theses.⁷ This resulting

Willkie singles out as having the most radical leanings on the court, has gone farther in his opinions than any other Justice since Taney in upholding the taxing power of the states.

³ 9 Wheaton 1 (1824).

⁴ 12 Wheaton 419 (1827).

⁵ See *Willson v. The Black Bird Creek Marsh Company*, 2 Peters 245 (1829). Marshall accepted the exclusiveness of the commerce power in some cases and rejected it in others. He justified his inconsistency by judging the "nature of the power" in each case. See *Sturges v. Crowninshield*, 4 Wheaton 122 (1819).

⁶ See *The License Cases* (*Thurlow v. Massachusetts*), 5 Howard 504 (1846); *The Passenger Cases* (*Smith v. Turner*), 7 Howard 283 (1849); *Nathan v. Louisiana*, 8 Howard 73 (1850). Taney once said: "... the mere grant of power to the general government cannot, upon any just principle of construction, be construed as an absolute prohibition to the exercise of any powers over the same subject by the States . . . in my judgment, the State may . . . make regulations of commerce for its own ports or harbors, and for its own territory; and such regulations are valid unless they come in conflict with a law of Congress." *License Case*, 5 Howard 504, 579 (1846).

⁷ See *Cooley v. The Board of Wardens*, 12 Howard 299 (1851); *Woodruff v. Parham*, 8 Wallace 123 (1869); *Hinson v. Lott*, 8 Wallace 148 (1869); *State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts*, 15 Wallace 284 (1873). During the period of reconciliation the Court

synthesis was to become a new hypothesis upon which later justices based their dogmatic declarations that interstate commerce must be free from state taxation; and that the absence of congressional action was tantamount to a command that commerce should be free.⁸

The new hypothesis has been the foundation for most of the decisions rendered in cases concerning state taxation of interstate commerce. Its emphasis has varied at times, depending on the personnel of the Court. Some few jurists have flatly denied it, but most have worked from it as the given premise to their conclusions. Over a period of years, decisions have developed into doctrines, and doctrines crystallized into dogmas, making the commerce clause one of the foremost limits on the state taxing power, and placing interstate commerce in a position of privilege and immunity from normal state legislation which applied equally to local commerce.

Inevitably new problems were created by the rapid expansion of interstate activities and the growth of industry and corporate enterprise which took place after the Civil War. Undoubtedly there was discrimination against interstate commerce, and attempts on the part of the states to burden it. Unfortunately, the judges who were forced to cope with those problems and prevent unfair practices attempted to do so by use of generalities and dogmas. Particular decisions were followed blindly as precedent, being applied in different circumstances to new cases. Thus precedent became converted into a vicious doctrine which tended to burden intrastate commerce and place interstate commerce in a privileged position. The Constitution was lost sight of in a maze of constitutional law.

Certainly the intent of the Constitution was to free interstate commerce from burdensome legislation, discrimination, and retaliatory tactics. But just as certainly, the intent of the Constitution was never to free interstate commerce from all regulation and taxation and to give it an unduly privileged position in competition with local commerce. Interstate commerce should have an equal chance in competition with local commerce, but not a privileged immunity. As long as state governments exist, they must raise revenue, and interstate commerce should bear its just share of the tax burden.

allowed as much state taxation as possible, voiding few taxes on grounds other than discrimination.

⁸ See *Robbins v. Shelby County*, 120 U. S. 489 (1887); *Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Company v. Pennsylvania*, 122 U. S. 326 (1887); *Leloup v. Port of Mobile*, 127 U. S. 640 (1888); *Leisy v. Hardin*, 135 U. S. 100 (1890).

The entire doctrine of immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation was a judicial fiction built up and based upon the principle of the federal system, rather than upon specific constitutional provisions. The only limits on state taxation specified in the Constitution are the prohibitions against duties on tonnage (without the consent of Congress), and against taxation of imports and exports. The latter prohibition has long been held to apply only to foreign commerce.⁹ The states were supposedly free to tax in any way not directly prohibited by the Constitution.¹⁰

Doctrines based upon the theory of the federal system are certain to be variable, just as is the nature of the federal system itself. From old ideas, growing out of the conditions of the past, have been built constitutional principles, until a great volume of law has been created placing limitations on the taxing power of the states. The fictitious base of the doctrine has been responsible for the uncertainty at the top of the structure. The entire body of law has been built upon implied assumptions.

The principle of the immunity of interstate commerce from state taxation grew largely out of a fear of the abuse of power if granted to the states.¹¹ Wholesale prohibitions were made in cases in which there was some abuse of power, to prevent possible future abuses. Those

⁹ *Brown v. Maryland*, 12 Wheaton 419 (1827), the first case relating to state taxation of commerce, concerned foreign commerce. Marshall brought the principles of that case into the field of interstate commerce by a casual remark near the end of his lengthy opinion. "It may be proper to add," said Marshall, "that we suppose the principles laid down in this case to apply equally to importations from a sister state." 12 Wheaton 419, 449 (1827). The application of the doctrine of *Brown v. Maryland* to the subject of interstate commerce was repudiated in the *License Cases*, 5 Howard 504 (1847). *Woodruff v. Parham*, 8 Wallace 123 (1869), stated definitely that the prohibition against taxation of exports and imports applied only to foreign commerce.

¹⁰ Even Alexander Hamilton, ardent supporter of nationalism, accepted the principle that the states were free to tax in any way not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Hamilton said: "... I am willing here to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which requires that the individual states should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its Constitution." *The Federalist*, No. XXXII, (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1937), 206.

¹¹ "It is obvious that the same power which imposes a light duty, can impose a very heavy one, one which amounts to a prohibition. Questions of power do not depend on the degree to which it may be exercised." Chief Justice Marshall in *Brown v. Maryland*, 12 Wheaton 419, 439 (1827).

doctrines were made so broad as to invalidate acts whether they were abusive or not. Thus the states were deprived of great sources of revenues and their taxing systems were made ineffective and discriminatory in favor of interstate businesses. The broad implications of the doctrine of immunity were developed before the substantive meaning was interpreted into the due process clause, at a time in which it was believed that, if a power were allowed at all, it might be exercised completely. After the development of the due process clause as a substantive limit on state action,¹² a double prohibition was erected against state taxes, and even though they might pass the test of the commerce clause, they were still subject to the limits of due process. Whatever basis there might have been for the limitation of the commerce clause became obsolete after the newer interpretation of the due process clause.¹³

The result of judicial interpretation of the commerce clause as a limit on the taxing power of the states has been a multitude of doctrines and a great deal of inconsistency and uncertainty in the law. Although doctrines are often spoken of as if they were absolute, the fact remains that so many doctrines have been applied that the result has been utter confusion. It has long been declared that interstate commerce may not be taxed by the states, but the decisions show that interstate commerce may be, and is, so taxed. A doctrine declares that gross receipts from interstate commerce may not be taxed;¹⁴ but a property tax measured by receipts from interstate commerce is likely to be upheld.¹⁵ A doctrine maintains that the franchise or privilege of engaging in interstate commerce may not be taxed;¹⁶ but if the franchise is treated as intangible

¹² For an excellent discussion of the change to the substantive interpretation of "due process," see Walton Hale Hamilton, "The Path of Due Process of Law," 48 *Ethics* 269 (1938).

¹³ Most laws which are now contested on the basis of the commerce clause are also contested under the due process clause.

¹⁴ See *Philadelphia and Southern Steamship Company v. Pennsylvania*, 122 U. S. 326 (1887); *Galveston, etc., v. Texas*, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); *Crew Levick Company v. Pennsylvania*, 245 U. S. 292 (1917); *New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board of Taxes and Assessments*, 280 U. S. 338 (1930); *Fisher's Blend Station, Inc., v. State Tax Commission*, 297 U. S. 650 (1936); *J. D. Adams Manufacturing Company v. Storen*, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).

¹⁵ *Maine v. Grand Trunk Railway Company*, 142 U. S. 217 (1891); *Wisconsin and Michigan Railway Company v. Powers*, 191 U. S. 379 (1903); *United States Express Company v. Minnesota*, 223 U. S. 335 (1912); *Cudahy Packing Company v. State of Minnesota*, 246 U. S. 450 (1918); *Pullman Company v. Richardson*, 261 U. S. 330 (1923); *Great Northern Railway Company v. Minnesota*, 278 U. S. 503 (1929).

¹⁶ *Leloup v. Mobile*, 127 U. S. 640 (1888); *Crutcher v. Kentucky*, 141 U. S. 47 (1891); *Postal Telegraph Cable Company v. Adams*, 155 U. S. 688 (1895); *Looney v.*

property of a company engaged in interstate commerce, a state may levy on it.¹⁷ One doctrine holds that if a tax is laid on a proper subject within the taxing jurisdiction of the state, the tax is valid regardless of its measure.¹⁸ On the other hand, a tax on an admittedly proper subject may be voided if the nature of the measure is deemed unconstitutional.¹⁹ A tax on capital stock may be upheld if the tax is for local privilege;²⁰ but if the local privilege is so related to interstate commerce as to allow the tax to burden that commerce, the tax is void.²¹ A state may tax property used or sold in interstate commerce;²² but it may not tax the privilege of selling in interstate commerce nor may it tax a sale which involves an interstate transaction.²³ Property actually in transit in interstate commerce may not be taxed by a state;²⁴ but if the goods are temporarily halted during the transit, or are not actually in movement at taxing time, the state may assess them along with the other property of

Crane Company, 245 U. S. 178 (1917); *Helson and Randolph, Co-Partners, v. Kentucky*, 279 U. S. 245 (1929).

¹⁷ *Horn Silver Mining Company v. New York*, 143 U. S. 305 (1892); *Henderson Bridge v. Kentucky*, 166 U. S. 150 (1897); *Adams Express Company v. Ohio State Auditor*, 165 U. S. 194 (1897); *Southern Railway Company v. Watts*, 260 U. S. 519 (1923); *Schwab v. Richardson*, 263 U. S. 88 (1923); *Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., Inc.*, 293 U. S. 15 (1934).

¹⁸ *Natban v. Louisiana*, 8 Howard 73 (1850); *Osborne v. Mobile*, 16 Wallace 479 (1873); *Tiernan v. Rinker*, 102 U. S. 123 (1880); *Ficklen v. Shelby County*, 145 U. S. 1 (1892); *Pullman Company v. Adams*, 189 U. S. 420 (1903); *Postal Telegraph-Cable Company v. City of Fremont*, 255 U. S. 124 (1921).

¹⁹ *Galveston, etc., v. Texas*, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); *Western Union v. Kansas*, 216 U. S. 1 (1910); *Pullman Company v. Kansas*, 216 U. S. 56 (1910); *Ludwig v. Western Union*, 216 U. S. 146 (1910); *Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company v. O'Conner*, 223 U. S. 280 (1912); *New Jersey Bell Telephone Co. v. State Board*, 280 U. S. 338 (1930); *Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen*, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).

²⁰ See *Ashley v. Ryan*, 153 U. S. 436 (1894); *Kansas City, etc., Railroad Co. v. Stiles*, 242 U. S. 111 (1916); *St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co. v. Middlekamp*, 256 U. S. 226 (1921); *Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts*, 231 U. S. 68 (1913); *Atlantic Refining Co. v. Virginia*, 302 U. S. 22 (1937).

²¹ *Western Union v. Kansas*, 216 U. S. 1 (1910); *Pullman Co. v. Kansas*, 216 U. S. 56 (1910); *Looney v. Crane Co.*, 245 U. S. 178 (1917).

²² *Hinson v. Lott*, 8 Wallace 148 (1869); *Brown v. Houston*, 114 U. S. 622 (1885); *American Steel and Wire Co. v. Speed*, 192 U. S. 500 (1904); *Wiloil Corporation v. Pennsylvania*, 294 U. S. 169 (1935).

²³ *Brown v. Maryland*, 12 Wheaton 419 (1827); *Robbins v. Shelby County*, 120 U. S. 489 (1887); *Asber v. Texas*, 128 U. S. 129 (1888); *Lyng v. Michigan*, 135 U. S. 161 (1890); *Rearick v. Pennsylvania*, 203 U. S. 507 (1906); *Standard Oil Co. v. Graves*, 249 U. S. 389 (1919); *Texas Co. v. Brown*, 258 U. S. 466 (1922); *Sonneborn v. Cureton*, 262 U. S. 506 (1923). The taxation of interstate sales is somewhat uncertain at the present time. See page 11.

²⁴ *Case of the State Freight Tax*, 15 Wallace 232 (1873); *Kelley v. Rhoads*, 188 U. S. 1 (1903); *Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota*, 272 U. S. 469 (1926).

the state.²⁵ Taxes on net income from interstate commerce are not considered as taxes on that commerce,²⁶ but the net income which arises from business in several states must be apportioned to the taxing state, if it arises from several states.²⁷

A tax on, or measured by, gross receipts from interstate commerce meets the disapproval of the court. Yet, while holding taxes on gross receipts invalid, the court allows taxation of property measured by gross receipts, if in lieu of other property taxes. There seems to be little real difference between a tax on gross receipts and a tax nominally on property but measured by gross receipts; and interstate commerce would be burdened as much by one as by the other, if the real effect of the tax were considered.

The same peculiar inconsistency appears with respect to taxation of acts and occupations. A tax, properly worded so as to appear to rest only on the local act of production will be upheld by the court even though measured by receipts from interstate commerce.²⁸ If, however, the taxing statute is worded so as to show that the tax falls upon the receipts from interstate commerce rather than upon the local act, the tax is voided.²⁹ Mere technicalities in the wording of an act, rather than the actual effect of the tax on interstate commerce, may be the deciding factor. There is little difference between a tax nominally levied on the act of production but measured by gross receipts, and a tax on the receipts themselves.

Again, with respect to taxation of sales, the inconsistency appears. The tendency for a number of years has been to allow the state of destination to tax goods bought and received in the state in interstate commerce. The culmination of this tendency occurred in a very recent decision of the Supreme Court—*McGoldrick, City Comptroller, v. Ber-*

²⁵ *Coe v. Errol*, 116 U. S. 517 (1886); *Diamond Match Co. v. Ontonagon*, 188 U. S. 82 (1903); *Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.* 249 U. S. 134 (1919); *Federal Compress and Warehouse Co. v. McLean*, 291 U. S. 17 (1934).

²⁶ *U. S. Glue Company v. Town of Oak Creek*, 247 U. S. 321 (1918); *Underwood Typewriter Company v. Chamberlain*, 254 U. S. 113 (1920); *Colgate v. Harvey*, 296 U. S. 404 (1935); *Matson Navigation Co. v. State Board*, 297 U. S. 441 (1936).

²⁷ *Hans Rees' Sons v. North Carolina*, 283 U. S. 123 (1931).

²⁸ See *Ficklen v. Shelby County*, 145 U. S. 1 (1892); *American Manufacturing Co. v. St. Louis*, 250 U. S. 459 (1919); *Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord*, 262 U. S. 172 (1923); *Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co.*, 260 U. S. 245 (1922); *Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall*, 274 U. S. 284 (1927); *Utah Power and Light Co. v. Pfof*, 286 U. S. 165 (1932).

²⁹ *Galveston, etc., v. Texas*, 210 U. S. 217 (1908); *Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania*, 245 U. S. 292 (1917); *Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen*, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).

*wind-White Coal Mining Co.*⁸⁰ There, the sales tax of the city of New York was upheld as applying to a sale of goods by a mining company, with sales offices in New York, to a firm in the city. The contract for sale was made prior to shipment and the decision upholding the sales tax overruled the dictum (and what was considered to be the rule for such taxation) of the case of *Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton*.⁸¹ Evidently the law at the present time allows state taxation of sales contracted for and culminating within the city, even though the contract be made prior to shipment and interstate shipment be a requisite of the sale.

Such a ruling seems inconsistent with the continued avowal that gross receipts from interstate commerce may not be taxed. There can be little difference between a tax on an individual sale made in interstate commerce and a tax on total sales made in that commerce. Yet the former is viewed as the equivalent of a tax on property or use of property in the state,⁸² whereas the latter is frowned upon as a tax upon a privilege and a direct burden upon interstate commerce.⁸³ Even when a tax on interstate sales is disallowed, the same result may be achieved by means of a use tax.⁸⁴ The court maintains that gross receipts from interstate commerce may not be taxed, but the fact remains that such receipts may be taxed if the statute is properly drawn.

To a great degree the constitutional rule for state taxation of interstate commerce has become simply the "rule of reason."⁸⁵ Doctrines have been developed and applied so as to allow for almost any decision on almost any case. As one authority said:⁸⁶

With doctrines that the court accepts when it pleases and rejects when it pleases, one who would look at the future along lines of doctrines is likely soon to suffer from intellectual strabismus.

⁸⁰ 60 Supreme Court Reporter 388 (1940).

⁸¹ *Sonneborn Brothers v. Cureton, Attorney General of the State of Texas, et al.*, 262 U. S. 506 (1923).

⁸² *McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Mining Co.*, 60 Supreme Court Reporter 388 (1940).

⁸³ *J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen*, 304 U. S. 307 (1938).

⁸⁴ See *J. Bacon & Sons v. Martin*, 305 U. S. 380 (1939); *Felt & Tarrant Manufacturing Co. v. Gallagher et al.*, 306 U. S. 62 (1939); *Southern Pacific Co. v. Gallagher et al.*, 306 U. S. 167 (1939).

⁸⁵ It might be argued that the cases should be judged under the due process rather than under the commerce clause. In those instances in which the state is allowed to tax interstate commerce, the tax remains subject to the prohibitions of the due process interpretation. Since the turn of the century, most cases are argued under both the commerce clause and the due process clause, and apparently the decision might be made as well under the latter as under the former—possibly better.

⁸⁶ Powell, T. R., "State Income Taxes and the Commerce Clause," 31 *Yale Law Journal* 799, 817 (1922).

The nature of the decision, therefore, is largely dependent upon the personnel of the Supreme Court at a particular time. Those judges who are determined to free interstate commerce from taxation as much as possible can find ample precedent to support their views. Likewise, those judges who desire to allow the greatest freedom to the states in taxing interstate commerce can support their viewpoints by past decisions and doctrines. Such a condition seems to be the inevitable result of regulation of interstate commerce by judicial decision. Litigation is a negative method rather than a positive one. The Court may not make and administer law in detail; it may only promulgate doctrines, which may or may not adequately solve the problems.³⁷

Attempts to apply old doctrines to new conditions sometimes result in distortions. New problems arise in a changing society and the interpretation of the law must adapt itself to fulfill the requirements of the day.³⁸ Whenever changing social and economic conditions cause the outmoding of individual doctrines which can no longer serve their original function, those doctrines should be reviewed and restated in such ways as to harmonize with the present needs of society. That is the situation in which the doctrine of taxation of interstate commerce finds itself today. The conditions of the past century may possibly have warranted the creation of the doctrine, but the civilization of today presents vastly different problems from those of the past century. Constitutional law should reflect that change and free itself from the shackles of precedent which is irrelevant to present conditions.

The Court is fumbling for a way out of this labyrinth of inconsistencies and uncertainties. Most of the members of the present Court agree that interstate commerce may be taxed, along with local commerce, as long as it is not burdened.³⁹ Yet, some justices still refer to the dogmatic declaration that interstate commerce should be free from

³⁷ "Judicial control of national commerce—unlike legislative regulations—must from inherent limitations of the judicial process treat the subject by the hit and miss method of deciding single local controversies upon evidence and information limited by the narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national rules which alone can afford that full protection for interstate commerce intended by the Constitution." Mr. Justice Black dissenting in *McCarroll, Com'r of Revenues of Arkansas, v. Dixie Greyhound Lines*, 60 Supreme Court Reporter 504 (1940).

³⁸ For example, the law was worked out for taxation of interstate carriers in the last century, but it was found inapplicable to the problem of interstate motor vehicles. A new type of transportation required new rules governing its taxation by the states.

³⁹ See opinions of Stone and Brandeis.

taxation by the states.⁴⁰ Still another viewpoint on the Court is the opinion that, excepting discrimination and actual multiple taxation, interstate commerce should be subject to state taxation completely, until Congress exercises its authority to prevent such taxation.⁴¹

The doctrine that interstate commerce may be taxed by the states so long as they do not directly burden that commerce is capable of a satisfactory solution to the problem. The two factors which today seem to determine actual burden are discrimination and multiple taxation. They should suffice, if interpreted in a realistic manner. If the judges thoroughly examine the facts and circumstances of the cases before them, and draw their conclusions from the actual effects of the tax in the light of sociological conditions, the doctrine should work. If, on the other hand, judges blind themselves to facts and revert to the practice of resting their decisions on doctrines and precedent, rather than upon facts and conditions, the muddle will continue uncleared, and the present problems will become more aggravated.

The majority of the Court voids taxes which they hold to be susceptible to multiple taxation. Mr. Justice Black urges that there should be actual multiple taxation before a state tax is voided.⁴² From a strictly constitutional viewpoint, Mr. Justice Black's position is almost unassailable. He is pointing the way back to the Constitution, rather than to past decisions of particular judges.⁴³ His interpretation is a greater break with precedent, but it is more realistic than an interpretation based entirely upon precedent. In the past there was too much of a tendency to apply principles stated in early decisions to later cases which were quite dissimilar; this practice resulted in doctrines which condemned whole classes of taxes, whether good or bad.

A departure from doctrine such as Mr. Justice Black suggests is shocking to the legalist. Probably Black's interpretation will not become the opinion of the Court—at least not soon. But it may be useful in helping to bring about a more realistic interpretation of the law governing state taxation of interstate commerce. Its boldness may shatter smug affinities to outmoded doctrines, and result in the conciliation of

⁴⁰ See statements of McReynolds, and lately of Hughes and Roberts.

⁴¹ See dissenting opinions of Black.

⁴² See Black's dissenting opinions in *J. D. Adams Manufacturing Co. v. Storen, Chief Administrative Officer, et al.*, 304 U. S. 307 (1938); and *Gwin, White, & Prince, Inc., v. Henneford et al.*, 305 U. S. 434 (1939).

⁴³ Black's viewpoint is more nearly that of Chief Justice Taney, who urged that law existed as an instrument of society and that the Constitution must be interpreted in such a way as to fit the needs of society.

conflicting ideas into a newer synthesis more adaptable to the exigencies of the present conditions.

A great deal is being written and argued today about interstate barriers and a return to the chaotic commercial conditions which existed under the Articles of Confederation.⁴⁴ Some experts argue that such conditions have resulted from too liberal an allowance by the Court of state taxation of interstate commerce, and that commerce should be freed from those restrictions. It is possible, however, that those barriers, inasmuch as they do exist today, may be at least partially the result of the judicial doctrines of limitation on the taxing power of the states. During the period in which an absolute prohibition against state taxation of interstate commerce was being urged, alternative doctrines had to be developed to allow taxation of some sort. Those alternative doctrines sometimes allowed in practice what was prohibited in theory, but the reliance upon doctrine caused the Court to uphold state acts upon other doctrines. Had the Court retained its vigilance against discriminatory acts on the part of the states, and had it continued to allow state taxation of interstate commerce, if the tax did not actually burden that commerce, legislation which was discriminatory in effect could have been voided. When the departure was made from the principle of discrimination, and in its place was substituted a dogmatic prohibition, then discriminatory acts were sustained when they did not fall within the prohibition. The result was to void all taxes of certain types, regardless of their actual effects, and to uphold all taxes of certain other types, whether discriminatory or fair. Doctrine and precedent were followed regardless of the effects or circumstances.

When the absolute prohibition against taxation of interstate commerce was declared, the states were forced into subversive practices in order to equalize interstate and local tax burdens and to protect local commerce against the immunity of interstate commerce. For example, the use tax is often condemned as a means of creating interstate bar-

⁴⁴ See, for example, Graves, W. Brooke, Editor, *Intergovernmental Relations In The United States*, Vol. 207, Thorsten Sellin, Editor, *The Annals*, (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, January, 1940), and the bibliography listed therein; Taylor, George R., Edgar L. Burtis, and Frederick V. Waugh, *Barriers To Internal Trade in Farm Products*, A Special Report of the Department of Agriculture (Washington, D. C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1939), and the bibliography listed therein.

See also *State Trade Barriers: Selected Reference*, Economic Library List No. 1 (Washington, D. C.: United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1939).

riers, and stifling interstate trade. Yet, the use tax was an essential outgrowth of the doctrine of immunity of interstate commerce. If interstate sales could not be taxed, but local transactions were burdened with a sales tax, interstate commerce would have an unfair competitive advantage over local commerce.⁴⁵ The use tax was added as a supplement to state sales taxes in order to assess the use of a commodity on which no sales tax had been paid, after that commodity had reached its destination within the state. True, the use tax may be abused, but it is such abuses that the Supreme Court could condemn under the principle of direct burden.

If the states are to continue to exist as an integral part of the federal system, they must adequately perform the functions which devolve upon them. With increasing obligations and new functions and services to be performed, the states are forced to seek steadily increasing revenues. At the same time, more and more commerce is becoming interstate in character. If the dogmatic prohibitions that interstate commerce could not be taxed by the states were continued, state subjects of taxation would be diminished and state revenue would shrink in the face of increasing obligations. The federal system would certainly be placed in a precarious position under those circumstances.

True, many problems which were once local in nature have outgrown state boundaries and have been brought under the jurisdiction of the national government. There can be little objection to that inevitable trend. But when the states cannot perform their true functions because of limited financial resources, there will be a clamor raised for federal participation in other fields—fields which could be left with the states but for limited funds. The surest way to destroy the states is to cut off their sources of revenue. To preserve the states, their power of taxation must be kept inviolate.

The modern trend in the decisions of the Supreme Court seems to recognize that problem. Time and again, the need for state revenue is urged. Interstate commerce must pay its way along with local commerce; and the former must not be placed in a privileged position in competition with the latter through immunity from state taxation. Equality

⁴⁵ It might even be argued that the rise to prominence of the sales tax was a result of the freeing of interstate commerce from state taxation. States in desperate circumstances for sources of revenue were forced to the sales tax; but if they had been allowed to tax interstate commerce along with local property and privileges, the need for the sales tax might not have arisen.

should be the theme of state laws and court decisions, treating both interstate and intrastate commerce alike.

Throughout most of our history we have been concerned with promoting commerce and keeping it free from obstructions and burdens. So much emphasis was placed on that idea that many came to believe that the intent of the Constitution was that commerce should be free—from national as well as state regulation. As long as only the states were attempting to tax or regulate interstate commerce, the attack was against state legislation. In recent years, since Congress has entered the field of regulation of commerce, some who opposed state regulation have now attacked congressional regulations as well.

This study is not concerned with the advance of congressional regulations of interstate commerce or the interpretation of the commerce clause in that direction. It is concerned only with state taxation of interstate commerce; and there is no necessary conflict between the extension of national regulation and the extension of state taxation. A state tax is not necessarily a regulation. It is a means of raising revenue. A state tax and a national regulation may be placed on the same commerce without the necessity of conflict. Of course, if there be conflict, the national law must be supreme. But otherwise the Court could allow both without violating the letter or the spirit of the Constitution. Congress was given the power to regulate; the states retained the power to tax. Both may exist on the same subject without materially hindering each other.

One solution to the problem of conflicting theories of doctrine may be a more active participation by Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce and in the allowance of state taxation of that commerce.⁴⁶ It has been urged that Congress might settle the problem of the immunity of interstate commerce from state sales taxes by an act allowing taxation of sales in interstate commerce and the collection of those sales taxes through certain approved administrative procedures. Congressional regulation might also be extended to include rules of apportionment for property valuation and for allocation of income from interstate commerce to the taxing states. Such a method would insure uniformity and would protect interstate commerce from discriminatory state taxes, while at the same time allowing the states to tax interstate businesses and incomes, which to a very large extent have been escaping taxation.

⁴⁶ Such action has been taken in that direction in several fields; *e.g.*, liquor, oleomargarine, convict-made goods.

Those businesses constitute a valuable source of revenue for the states, and should Congress be able to work out a system under which state taxes would not unduly burden interstate commerce, then such taxation might be allowed under the rulings of the commerce clause.⁴⁷

Thus, those interested in preserving the integrity of the states and their position within the federal system might best look to regulation of commerce by Congress, rather than rely upon judicial interpretation of the commerce clause.⁴⁸ If the federal system is to be maintained, the states must have additional revenues to perform those functions which are properly state functions. If the states cannot properly perform those functions, then inevitably the trend toward national centralization will continue. If government is to act as an agency of the people and fulfill the needs of society, it must not be restricted by artificial limitations on power. If a federal government is deemed desirable for a society such as ours, then both elements of the federal system must be allowed to perform their functions, the proper performance of which depends so largely upon adequate financial resources and the power of taxation.

⁴⁷ It has sometimes been argued that Congress could not regulate interstate commerce by allowing state taxation of that commerce. Such argument seems to have little merit or basis in constitutional law, since the limits on the taxing power of the states grew out of the *absence* of Congressional action and the view that such inaction meant that commerce should be free. Chief Justice Fuller once remarked: "We recall no decision giving color to the idea that when Congress acted its action would be less potent than when it kept silent." *In re Rahrer, Petitioner*, 140 U. S. 545, 562 (1891).

⁴⁸ As far back as 1904, Frank J. Goodnow recommended that the right of the states to tax interstate commerce be recognized but the exercise be limited by Congress. See Goodnow, Frank J., "State Taxation of Interstate Commerce," *American Economic Association Publications*, Series 3, Vol. 5, pp. 307-29 (1904).

Variations in Buying Habits of Different Consumer Groups¹

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Consumer buying habits will constitute the core of any changes in the conditions of distribution. It would obviously be inadvisable to attempt to embrace the entire field of consumer buying habits in a short paper, so these remarks will be confined to consumer variations which affect their buying habits, with particular emphasis on retail trading areas.

The fact that different types of customers have widely different buying habits will quickly be discovered in any retail trading area analysis. This fact is recognized by all retailers, but its effects upon the extent of areas of trade influence are not so self-evident.

Most retailers realize that in order to succeed they must direct their sales promotion efforts toward certain consumer groups; that if they serve well only one or a few consumer groups with common characteristics, their efforts will be more profitable.

Consequently, in order to select his clientele, the progressive merchant will usually break down the total population of his trading area into subdivisions of one or more of the following groups: occupation, social status, education, wealth and income, size of family, type of residence, religion, race and nationality, age and sex, and location. As the retailer selects those classes of customers whose patronage he will solicit within each group, each decision will result in an alteration of his trading area. This alteration may take place in two ways.

First, his decision to limit the number of customers will alter the intensity of patronage within a given area. By "intensity of patronage" is meant that proportion of the population within a given area which patronizes a store. The "patronage potential" of a store will be reduced if the merchant changes from medium-priced goods to high-priced "exclusive" merchandise. The patronage potential of such a store would

¹ Paper presented in the Business Administration Section of the Southwestern Social Science Association, at the Dallas Convention, March 22, 1940.

be low, whereas a neighborhood grocer, selling goods purchased by practically all families within his restricted trade territory, would have a high patronage potential.²

The second alteration of his trade territory will be extensive rather than intensive. As the merchant limits the classes of consumers to whom he will appeal, the geographic boundaries of his trading area change.³ As consumer groups are subdivided, what variations in trading habits will be found within each group?

TABLE I
RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MEN AND WOMEN AS BUYERS

COMMODITY	PERCENT OF PURCHASES	
	By MEN	By WOMEN
Silks	2	98
Jewelry	10	90
All Goods in Department Stores	18	82
Groceries	19	81
Electrical Supplies	20	80
Drug Store Items	22	78
Pianos	22	78
Men's Socks	25	75
Leather Goods	33	67
Men's Neckwear	37	63
Hardware	51	49
Automobiles	59	41

Source: Kenneth Goode and Harford Powel, Jr., *What About Advertising?* (New York, Harper Brothers, 1927), p. 115.

Sex and Age

Major variations in buying habits appear in comparisons of men's and women's purchasing. It has been estimated that 85 per cent of all retail purchases are made by women. This estimate has been substantiated by studies such as the one shown in Table I. It is clear that women spend a large proportion of the nation's consumer income, in their ca-

² A distinction has been made here between "patronage potential"—that proportion of the population within a given area which may logically be considered potential customers of the store—and "intensity of patronage"—that proportion which actually does patronize a store.

³ Often, a merchant must decide whether he wishes to cultivate his "market" more intensively or extensively, i.e., shall he concentrate his selling efforts on the customers in the vicinity of his store, or shall he expand his area of operations to take in more territory. Costs of marketing will increase if expansion is attempted in either manner (although these increased costs may be more than offset by lower unit costs in purchasing large quantities, etc.).

capacity as "the purchasing agent for the family." However, it must not be inferred from this that men are unimportant in influencing these purchases. Men have a definite influence on the brands, kinds, and prices of commodities, even though women do 85 per cent of the buying.⁴

Table I gives some indication of possible reasons for variations in trading areas according to the sex of the purchaser. When different commodities and types of stores are analyzed, it has been found that women do more purchasing away from the home town than do men. For one thing, women will devote more time and effort to shopping than will men.

Also, to women, considerable subjective value is attached to some article "picked up in the city." To a much greater degree than men, women will make a distinct effort to avoid purchasing garments or shoes, duplicates of which other women of their acquaintance have purchased, or which have been displayed prominently in home town stores with price tags attached.

Men do not object to standardization of clothing to the degree that women do. As a consequence, retail outlets for the major brands of men's clothing and shoes may profitably be located in smaller trade centers. The greater accessibility of these outlets, then, accounts in part for the fact that fewer men than women find it necessary to purchase such articles in larger centers.

Analysis of these variations in trading areas reveals that for certain commodities women will travel considerably further than men. Thus, stores catering to men will attract trade from smaller areas than will stores selling similar types of merchandise to women. The approach to this problem through studies of specific commodities has given more definite information, clarifying and substantiating the *a priori* reasoning indulged in above.

Age differences in consumers may affect trading areas in several ways: through the relative mobility of the consumer, the quantity and direction of purchasing, and the degree into which buying habits have been established in fixed patterns. That the age of the consumer will affect his or her mobility is a matter of common knowledge; *ceteris paribus*

⁴ A study of the "Relative Influence of Men and Women in the Purchase of Twelve Commodities" was made in 1933 by Harry W. Hepner (published by *Redbook Magazine*), which showed that men exerted considerable influence upon prices, brands, and kinds of merchandise, despite the fact that women did most of the actual purchasing.

consumers in their prime will travel greater distances for desired merchandise.

The quantity of purchasing done by persons in different age groups will also change. The mother, as the household's buying agent, spends most of the family's income. As the dependent family increases in size, the income tends to rise, and more buying is done. The younger members of the family mature—they establish their own households usually in their twenties—and changes in both the quantity and type of goods purchased inevitably occur. In the declining years, most consumers are faced with decreasing incomes, which again will alter buying habits.

Habit patterns become more stable as a consumer travels life's pathway. Younger people are more receptive to new ideas; they are more inclined to experiment. Starting at about the age of twelve, the youth comes into his own as a semi-independent consumer. His desires are plastic—it is easier to establish new habits of consumption than it will be later. Young adults are more easily influenced to try new products; to break away from the established buying habits of the "older generation." Advertising men have long recognized that the "formative years"—the twenties and thirties—are of utmost significance in establishing brand loyalty.⁵ Habits tend to crystallize with age. After the age of forty people tend to become more settled—to buy nearer their homes than younger people. This is especially true of a period of rapid expansion of trading areas, such as has been experienced during the past twenty-five years.

Standard of Living

Unquestionably, the major variations in trading areas observable among different groups of consumers may be related to their standards of living. Those who maintain higher standards of living will have greater mobility and purchasing power, enabling them to travel further afield in search of the specific articles of merchandise which they desire.

What is the "standard of living," and how may this broad concept be subdivided, so as to facilitate analysis? Dr. Paul H. Nystrom has indicated certain variations in standards of living, and reasons for these variations, which will be helpful in the present study. These are: personal or individual differences, historic changes, variations due to size

⁵ See Fawcett Publications, Inc., *The Age of Brand Susceptibility* (New York, Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1938), p. 41, and Everett R. Smith, *Age and Income of Those Who Buy* (New York, MacFadden Publications, Inc., 1938), p. 9.

of family, wealth and income, geographic variations, occupational and social variations, and variations due to education and natural ability.⁶

These classifications are so interrelated that it becomes difficult to discuss one group without referring to the others. The first—personal or individual differences—has already been recognized. Each individual has certain characteristics and behavior patterns which differ from those of any other individual. However, it is only through the study of a number of individuals that we may ascertain the types of behavior which may be expected of a group of people.

The size of a family is related to the standard of living mainly through the changes in buying habits resulting from larger or smaller families with the same incomes. As this is largely a question of the uses to which income will be put, it will be discussed in the section on purchasing power.

Occupational and social variations, although practically inseparable from income and purchasing power, throw sufficient additional light on the problem to be treated in a later section. Education and natural ability have a definite influence upon buying habits. The difficulty involved in measuring this phase of consumer variations necessitates consolidation with some related classification. Perhaps the best indication may be found in the occupation of an individual; consequently this will be related to occupational differences.

In this section of the analysis, then, we may look at the other variations; those categories which reflect the wealth, income, and purchasing power of consumers. More studies have been made, and more direct evidence is available on this subject, than may be found on other consumer variations.

To avoid controversy in the use of terms, "income" and "purchasing power" will be used synonymously here. Income constitutes one of the best indicators of consumer buying habits available to the market analyst. If he knows the amount of income received, allowing for minor exceptions, he may picture quite readily the time and money spent in travel, in recreation, and on different classes of commodities. It is possible to picture shopping habits with considerable accuracy.

First, it is reasonable to assume that higher income classes will have greater mobility, and that they will demand fashion merchandise not obtainable locally. Higher income families have a larger proportion of

⁶ Paul H. Nystrom, *Economic Principles of Consumption* (New York, The Ronald Press Company, 1931), p. 250.

their income to spend upon fashion goods; they will desire to locate larger assortments of merchandise from which to choose. Increased income results in an increase in the quality, variety, and quantity of goods purchased. Families possessing great wealth are perhaps the largest spenders for education, insurance, travel, homes, and furniture.

Those with low incomes cannot afford those luxury items which are accepted as "conventional necessities" in wealthier families. Studies of consumer buying habits by W. J. Reilly showed that "C" and "D" classes of consumers were usually able to satisfy their needs in very small towns, and that these classes of people traded very little outside the communities in which they lived unless a large city was very near.⁷ Studies made by the Market Research Service at the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College have confirmed this.⁸

Only the "A" and "B" classes of people traveled long distances to satisfy their demands and when they did travel far it was usually to purchase such merchandise as women's fashion goods, special lines of jewelry, and furniture. Reilly concludes: "Thus it is clear that unless there is an appreciable proportion of 'A' and 'B' classes of customers in those smaller cities and towns which surround a large city market, the large city is limited in possibilities for the profitable extension and development of its retail-trade territory."⁹

In a study made this year in Stillwater, it was found that the upper income group, with a larger proportion of income available for fashion goods, desired to locate a greater assortment of merchandise from which to choose, and over 85% of this group went to metropolitan shopping centers to purchase primarily shopping goods.¹⁰ High income results in an increase in the quality, variety, and quantity of goods demanded.

As previously noted, those with lower incomes cannot afford those luxury items which are accepted as "conventional necessities" in wealthier families. In Stillwater it was found that the lower income group

⁷ "D" Class: unskilled laborers; "C" Class: skilled mechanics, mill operators, petty trades people; "B" Class: comfortable middle class; "A" Class: substantial wealth.

⁸ Perham C. Nahl, *Application of the Interview Method to a Trading Area Survey of Stillwater, Oklahoma* (Market Research Service, Stillwater, 1939), and Nahl, *Consumer Shopping Habits by Income and Occupational Groups* (Market Research Service, Stillwater, 1940).

⁹ William J. Reilly, *Methods for the Measurement of Retail Trade Territories*, (University of Texas, Austin, 1928), pp. 13-19.

¹⁰ Perham C. Nahl, *Consumer Shopping Habits by Income and Occupational Groups*, p. 23.

consumers were usually able to satisfy their needs in town and that these people traded very little outside of Stillwater. Only 18.3% of this lower income group ever shopped outside of Stillwater and their purchases were very restricted.

It is clear then that only the higher income groups travel long distances to satisfy their demands and when they do travel far, it is usually to purchase such merchandise as women's fashion goods, furniture, rugs and drapes, and men's clothing. The middle income classes lie somewhere between these two groups in their purchasing habits.

Occupational and Social Groups

By occupational groups it is possible to draw some interesting conclusions from the Stillwater study. So closely allied are occupations and incomes that one might question the advisability of a separate treatment of the two. One very important factor which has often been overlooked, however, is that it is seldom possible to determine accurately the income of an individual or of a family by direct evidence. A research organization cannot ask the direct question: "What is the salary of the head of the family?" and expect to receive correct answers in interviews. In the 1940 survey a number of indirect questions were used to estimate the possible incomes, and occupation was one of these. Occupations were classified into nine groups: Merchants, Executives, Professional, Skilled Labor, Common Labor, Clerical, Retired, Saleswork, and Unemployed.

In a general discussion of the occupational groups, no attempt will be made to summarize all the material available and only general tendencies will be observed here. The professional group is noteworthy for the amount of out-of-town shopping done. Professional people, as a rule, are not very much impressed with the buy-at-home argument. If local merchandise does not satisfy in all respects, most of the members of this group do not hesitate to look elsewhere. Lacking the immediate influence of local business interests, this group does not feel obligated to look at home before buying and is therefore sometimes quite unfamiliar with local stocks. Professional people of Stillwater are no exception to this generalization. Style goods are frequently purchased by professional people in Oklahoma City and in Tulsa; semi-style and staple goods are quite often bought from mail order houses as indicated by the 44.4% of Stillwater professional people who did this. In a number of similar surveys, professional people shopped out of town more than did any other group.

Merchants and executives, influenced by their own local business interests, are somewhat more loyal to the home merchants. They are conscious of the stress on home buying by various business and civic organizations and consequently do not purchase a great deal in other centers, unless they find the selection of merchandise inadequate at home. Well over 60% of each of these groups bought merchandise in other cities and it was evident from an analysis of their comments that "variety and quality" was the outstanding reason for their purchases out of town.

Salespersons constituted the third highest group, proportionately, of out-of-town shoppers. Those engaged in clerical work were in second place. These groups are more interested in price than are the merchants, although many people in these occupational classes have similar business interests. As they are closely associated with the business group, they are apt to imitate that group in its buying, though on a lower price basis. They are good patrons of local business; nevertheless out-of-town purchases are made largely because of lower prices and wide selections.

Skilled laborers buy more commodities out of town and trade in other cities more often than do common laborers. This is largely due to income factors, and we find that skilled laborers purchase in somewhat the same way as do clerical workers and salespeople. Retired people are near the bottom in frequency of out-of-town shopping and it is evident that since members of this group, on the average, are older than the others this affects their purchasing habits. The buying habits of the retired group have had more opportunity to be established in fixed patterns, and of course, the age of the consumer will affect his mobility.

The common labor and unemployed groups find it necessary to make most purchases on a price basis. They are not wealthy enough to seek much in the way of style or quality. They also have little mobility, either because of small purchasing power or full time employment. The common laborer, employed full time, finds it difficult to travel to the large cities; consequently only a very small proportion ever shop in Oklahoma City or Tulsa. The unemployed, with small purchasing power per family, have neither civic interest in home trade nor the means for shopping in larger cities. As a consequence, the irregularly employed may buy only the bare necessities, often in a second hand condition. They buy what they can at home and the balance of their patronage goes almost solely to the Mail Order Houses.

In general, it may be concluded that civic organizations with a desire to promote a greater amount of patronage of home stores may very well begin their buy-at-home arguments with the members of local civic groups. As has been pointed out by a number of those who have read the 1940 Stillwater Survey, the classes who predominate in the membership of the local Chamber of Commerce are the same ones doing the greatest amount of out-of-town shopping. And almost without exception, those who are most interested in retaining the patronage of local people for local businesses are the ones who make the greatest use of the shopping facilities of nearby large cities.

Studies in the Cost of Crime in Selected Counties in Arkansas

A. W. JAMISON
University of Arkansas

A number of years ago the writer made a careful search for material on crime published in Arkansas, and was surprised at the limited amount uncovered, though all leads were followed up. Later he had charge of the investigation for the Wickersham Commission for Arkansas. These affairs directed his attention more and more to the very meagre records of criminal matters.

Fifteen or more years ago the Attorney General's office issued biennial reports¹ of felonies by judicial districts and counties. These reports were made by the prosecuting attorneys of the districts and covered the following details: name of the alleged criminal, color, sex, crime charged, and disposition of the case. Nothing was noted about costs or damages, and there were no summaries. The record for the whole state, county by county, covered 428 pages with a standard of 18 names per page. A few pages were short but the total number of items listed for the biennium 1923-1924 was slightly under 7,700.

The following biennium, 1925-1926, the form of report was changed.² No county data were given, but summaries for the 18 judicial districts were made. The lists of kinds of offenses ranged from 10 in the 7th district of three counties with a total population of 45,274—of these 5,379 were colored—to 23 kinds of offenses in the 2nd district of seven counties with a population of 207,937, 58,629 being colored. A general summary for the state listed 28 kinds of offenses giving color and sex of the person charged. There was a total of 7,151 indicted. Of these 1,740 were nolle prossed, 493 acquitted, 4,928 convicted, 276 were reduced to misdemeanors, 47 life sentences, 540 suspended. The total indicted, 7,151, was considerably less than the 7,700 the preceeding biennium. Of these 5,256 were white and 1,892 colored.

The report was still more simplified by 1931-1932,³ for the general

¹ Report and Opinions of Attorney General of Arkansas, 1923-1924.

² *Ibid.*, 1925-1926.

³ *Ibid.*, 1931-1932.

summary reported nothing as to sex or color but did give total number indicted 6,420, nolle prossed 1,402, acquitted 582, reduced to misdemeanor 192, life sentences 67, death sentences 5, suspended 209, pending 114. Total convicted, 6,575 (*sic*). But the district courts had expanded to a better and more elaborate classification, including color, sex, nativity, citizenship, and average age per district. No county data were available. This report lists only 23 offenses compared with 28 in 1929-1930. But the report for 1935-1936 enlarges to 47 the list of offenses for which there were indictments for felonies; for this biennium there were reported 321 waivers, 6,463 indictments, 1,284 nolle prossed, 369 acquitted, 225 reduced to misdemeanor. For convictions for first degree murder, accessory to murder and abortion a total of 191 years were assessed, 74 were given life sentences, 15 death sentences, 802 suspended, 503 pending, with a total number of convictions 4,536.

There are very limited requirements on part of the state for the collection, tabulation or publication of data on crime of any sort; as to misdemeanors there seems to be no way of getting satisfactory information. With the facilities available the only method was by questionnaire. Questionnaires were sent to county officers and presented to officers by students when they were at home. At one time a questionnaire with return stamped envelope was sent to the judge of each county (75) with an urgent request for data. There was a fair response but the information secured was far less than hoped for.

The comments of those who handled questionnaires are of some interest. "I went to the county judge, who did not know anything about expenses, to hear him explain it; then to the county treasurer who also was unable to contribute any figures because of his complete vagueness in the matter; then I approached the sheriff and was nearly thrown out of his office when I mentioned the subject." The student explained that the county officers had recently been criticized by a local paper. One sheriff after writing out two small pages of description wound up, "Haven't time to check up on cost of trial as I am too busy with thieves, bootleggers, etc. Yours, X Y Z." Another student reported, "Information very hard to secure. No records kept for the purpose and records for other purposes inadequate." At one time ten reports came in at the same time for the same county. The totals varied from a low of \$31,400 to a high of \$142,400. The high figures were corroborated and explained by the inclusion of \$100,000 on account of damage caused by

or in connection with crime. Even leaving out this item the totals varied from \$31,400 to \$52,980.

A number of different forms were tried in an endeavor to reduce to a minimum the labor of filling out. None were very successful, and it is recognized that a really fair cross section of the state could be secured only by personal investigation under favorable circumstances. In some cases, as indicated above, officials are definitely hostile. Very rarely have two reports for the same county at the same time yielded the same figure. In some cases the care and ability and energy displayed in getting data were known, and in other cases the source and its dependability were considered good. But in many cases there has been no way in which to check accuracy unless two or three reports agreed with each other, and even then there is no certainty. However, the rather even run of figures in the list that appears later seems to indicate a reasonable degree of correctness. Of the thirty counties listed only four have a city of more than 10,000 population (1930 Census) and these counties have rather high costs per capita. (Cost per capita would appear to be the fairest way to compare counties). It is a matter of regret that data for Garland County, where Hot Springs is located, are not available. The figures would certainly be of interest, as the situation is unique, but they would not have much bearing on the general problem.

In the absence of legislative requirements there is no regularity, one might say, no similarity in county operation and records. Some counties allow the sheriff a per diem for feeding prisoners in the county jail, and the per diem varies considerably. The sheriff collects the per diem and pockets the difference after paying for prison fare. He also gets a salary and certain fees. Furthermore, it is hard to segregate fees chargeable to criminal matters from those relating to other services. In other counties the sheriff gets a larger salary and the cost of food is a bill against the county. Other county officers are remunerated in various ways. For those on a total or partial fee basis there seems to be no possible way to get precise figures.

These data have been collected in a number of different years in the 1920's and 1930's. The population of Arkansas by 1930 had gained over the 1920 population only 102,278, or 5.8 per cent. Forty-three of the seventy-five counties had fewer people in 1930 than in 1920. This is partly explainable by the frequent changes in county boundaries authorized by the legislature. As it is virtually impossible to check up these changes with alterations in population statistics the figures for

1930 are used and the error is probably negligible. Also as items are more easily forgotten than included erroneously the higher figure has been chosen, where several have been received, if there seemed to be any justification for so doing.

With the above explanations of uncertainties the following table gives the best data available for thirty of the seventy-five counties of the state.

PER CAPITA COST OF CRIME FOR 30 ARKANSAS COUNTIES

County	1930 Census Population	Cost of Crime	Cost per Capita
Benton.....	35,253	\$37,760	\$1.07
Boone.....	14,937	6,240	.42
Chicot.....	22,646	17,310	.76
Clay.....	27,278	15,616	.57
Crawford.....	22,549	23,604	1.04
Cross.....	25,723	10,492	.42
Desha.....	21,814	21,400	.98
Drew.....	19,928	29,010	1.40
Grant.....	9,834	9,552	.97
Green.....	26,127	17,553	.67
Independence.....	24,225	22,630	.93
Jackson.....	27,943	11,430	.41
Johnson.....	19,289	28,005	1.45
Jefferson*	64,154	57,976	.90
Lawrence.....	21,663	12,325	.52
Little River.....	15,515	26,806	1.72
Logan.....	24,110	29,960	1.25
Lonoke.....	35,759	18,540	.55
Madison.....	13,334	9,725	.73
Quichita.....	29,890	28,000	.94
Poinsett.....	29,695	25,660	.86
Pope.....	26,547	34,690	1.31
Prairie.....	15,187	11,230	.74
Pulaski*	137,727	224,000	1.62
St. Francis.....	33,394	31,700	.95
Saline.....	15,660	20,045	1.28
Scott.....	11,803	9,167	.78
Sebastian*	54,426	150,600	2.77
Sevier.....	16,364	11,760	.72
Union*	55,800	107,424	1.92
Totals.....	897,114		Average 1.03

*These thirty counties include the most prosperous, and those with larger cities. The four starred counties are the only ones in this list having a city of over 10,000. The list also includes a number of the poorer and more sparsely populated mountain counties. It would thus seem to be a fair sample of the state.

The population in 1930 for the whole state was 1,854,482. The population of these thirty counties in 1930 was 879,114 which is 47.5 per cent of the state's total.

With the above assumptions the cost of felonies in Arkansas amounts to some such figure as 1.9 million dollars a year. These are county figures and do not include state expenses, and are probably well under the actual costs.

An attempt was made to secure material along special lines, and as a result the following items may be of interest. The names of the counties are omitted as in some cases they might be carried back to individuals. The word "defendant" means the individual and his family and friends—all who contribute to his defense.

A man pleaded guilty of murder after three trials. Cost to the county was \$3,000; to the defendant, \$1,000. Six big crimes cost an average of \$500, and big crimes cost the county \$15,000 in damages. The average murder case in X county costs the county \$750.

Another murderer was given a life sentence at a trial cost of \$5,000 to the county; \$1,000 to the defendant.

A totally unassessable cost is indicated by this quotation, "A big crime interferes with routine for several weeks."

In another case the county spent \$2,500 and the defendant \$3,000. This county reported that in 1932 70 per cent of the expense was due to liquor law violations.

One county spent \$235 on a first degree murder case and the defendant spent \$1,000 and was acquitted!

A highly sensational rape case with the alleged torture and killing of the offender by the girl's relatives was such a severe financial drain that the judge is said to have told the public they must settle this thing and not let it go any farther lest it completely bankrupt the county.

Notes from the Southwest

SOUTHERN GRANT-IN-AID APPOINTEES OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, 1940-1941

Thomas Senior Berry, Instructor in Economics, Duke University, for a study of San Francisco prices, currency and trade, 1849-1880.

Thomas D. Clark, Associate Professor of History, University of Kentucky, for a history of the country and small-town store in the post-war South.

Wayne Dennis, Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Virginia, for a study of child development in the pueblo of Cochiti.

Weymouth Tyree Jordan, Assistant Professor of History, Judson College, for a study of pre-Civil War plantation practices in Alabama.

James Ernest Pate, Professor of Political Science, College of William and Mary, for a study of the law and practice of administrative tribunals in Virginia.

Ira de A. Reid, Professor of Sociology, Atlanta University, for a study of the adjustment of the British West Indian immigrants to the United States.

Edgar A. Schuler, Assistant Professor of Sociology, Louisiana State University, for a study of ecological patterns and processes in Baton Rouge, Louisiana.

Frances Butler Simkins, Associate Professor of History, Farmville State Teachers College, for a life of Benjamin Ryan Tillman, South Carolina agrarian leader.

OKLAHOMA

Central State College—Dr. Edward E. Keso, professor of history and geography at Central State College, Edmond, for the past eleven years, has accepted the position of associate professor of geography at the Northeast Missouri State Teachers College, Kirksville, effective September 1. His latest book, "Conserving Our Resources," was released from the press of the Times-Journal Publishing Co., Oklahoma City, last February.

TEXAS

University of Texas—Fladger F. Tannery, assistant professor of business administration, has left the campus on a leave of absence to survey

accounting systems of 25 state governments. His work will begin in Seattle, Washington, Sacramento, California, and Denver, Colorado.

Dr. Erich Roll of University College, Briston, England, will be a visiting member of the economics faculty this fall. He will take the place of Dr. Clarence E. Ayres, who has been granted leave of absence to teach at the University of Washington.

Harry E. Moore, assistant professor of sociology, and Ernest R. Groves, research professor in the University of North Carolina, are the authors of *An Introduction to Sociology*, recently published by Longmans.

Book Reviews

Edited By O. DOUGLAS WEEKS
The University of Texas

Fergusson, Erna, *Our Southwest*. Photographs by Ruth Frank and others. Maps. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940. pp. 376.)

The discovery of America which started with Columbus over four hundred years ago is still going on, for few people really know America. Roads, rails and skyplanes have made it easier to see more of the vast, strangely beautiful continent on which we live, but seeing is not always synonymous with understanding. Perhaps, the Indians knew America best, because they lived in intimate and harmonious relationship with their environment and were free from the tug and drain of other lands. The immigrant continued to see the new world in terms of the old, and only after many generations of living here did he begin to see America as it is and not as a European shadow.

There are many men and women who have and are contributing to the re-discovery of America. They include archeologists like Bandelier and Cushing, historians like Bolton and Webb, artists like Peter Hurd and Pedro Castañeda, writers like Cather and Dobie, and many others. What has long been needed is someone to weave the scattered material and interpretations into a unified whole, particularly for one of the most fascinating sections of the United States, the Southwest. Miss Erna Fergusson has performed this task brilliantly and beautifully in her latest book entitled *Our Southwest*.

Miss Fergusson begins her narrative with a chapter called "What is the Southwest?" This is not an easy question, because it is more than a mere matter of geography. It involves language, historical development, people, the geological age of mountains, the flow of wind through the arroyos, and, perhaps nothing more than the way a man rides. In short it is a matter of feeling growing out of the climate and soil. "The Southwest," writes the author, "is a crossing of South and West, but in the sense of breeding to produce offspring. It is neither South nor West, but a mestizo partaking of the characteristics of both parents, and like a child baffling to both." Thereupon, she fearlessly draws the boundary lines for the Southwest, which includes Arizona, New Mexico, western Texas, southern Colorado, and part of Utah. California, except for the deserts, is excluded, and Will Rogers is the only part of Oklahoma which is admitted.

The Southwest is a land of contrasts, improbabilities and exaggerations. There are vast heat-seared plains, brooding mesas, deserts like rainbows and soaring mountains. Almost every kind of plant and animal life lives within its boundaries. A snowshoe rabbit feeds on arctic plants in mid-summer on Pike's Peak; a few miles away palm trees grow in that terrible caldron of heat called Death

Valley. A bird attacks a rattlesnake; a man saves his life by drinking the water from a cactus. Mirages appear in the sky and rivers usually dry suddenly overflow and shift their boundaries.

All these things are described by Miss Fergusson with consummate mastery of her subject and a rare literary talent. *Our Southwest* is freighted with information, historical anecdotes, shrewd character sketches, and some very revealing profiles of the leading cities and towns of the Southwest. There is also the Southwest of the travel folders and the guide books with more than one allusion to matters which the local chamber of commerce would probably prefer to leave unmentioned. At times the cargo appears almost too heavy for one book to carry, yet the narrative moves swiftly and gracefully. Miss Fergusson praises the sterling qualities of the early pioneers, but does not fail to point out that they were often ignorant and narrow. The Southwesterner was "sturdy, humorous, friendly, and tolerant," and a man's best introduction was his own courage and ability. It was because Will Rogers epitomized these qualities so perfectly that he was included in the Southwest.

The Grand Canyon and the Carlsbad Caverns are handled with dignity and restraint. "In both canyon and cavern, color and form and immensity have baffled human descriptive powers as long as man has known them. No words can describe them, for they engage all the senses and something beyond. One does not see the Grand Canyon or the Carlsbad Caverns; they are experienced, and one is never the same again." Miss Fergusson's ability to see both sides of a question, sympathetically and humorously, is at its best in discussing the relationship between the Indian and his conquerors. "White men," she observes, "sold the government tainted meat and shoddy blankets for double the price of good stuff. Navajos, observant and quick, could learn a crooked game too. They forged the government's ration cards and managed to live by doubling freely in the weekly count." The Navajos, she concludes, are tragic but never pitiful.

The unifying and dominant force throughout the book is the climate. "The arid plains are even more significant than the mountains, for what has marked Southwestern life and thought, philosophy and religion, humor and despair, is aridity." It is this lack of water that limits the population and the productivity of the soil. That is why the Indians still dance their prayers for rain as they have done from time beyond memory. That is why the author writes, "The arid Southwest has always been too strong, too indomitable for most people. Those who can stand it have to learn that man does not modify this country; it transforms him, deeply." It is not a land of bread and honey. "But it is infinitely productive of the imponderables so much needed by a world weary of getting and spending. It is wilderness where a man may get back to the essentials of being a man."

Miss Fergusson has told the story of *Our Southwest* in historical perspective, which does much to give depth and power to the narrative. With rare skill and a fine appreciation of the essential, she has utilized the work of many scholars in the field as well as her own experiences and that of her friends. The currents of over a thousand years of historical development are faithfully delineated.

She explains a modern reclamation project as well as the great irrigation canals of the pre-historic Indian. She recreates the dramatic struggle between the Indian and the white man. There is also the Indian of today, divided between an alien culture and his own, hammering out pieces of silver for gaping tourists in a curio shop in Santa Fe. There is the hard, independent, dust covered cowboy of yesterday, riding, roping, and shooting; and there is his modern imitation the dude wrangler.

The historian will welcome *Our Southwest* as an invaluable synthesis and as a book that will act as a stimulating introduction to the Southwest for his students. Excellent references scattered throughout the study and the final chapter on "The Interpreters" will prove useful. Perhaps, because Miss Fergusson was born and reared in New Mexico, she never loses touch with reality or floods the reader with romance and sentiment. She is always scholarly, critical, and sensitive. The qualities that she ascribes to the Southwesterner—courage, friendliness, tolerance, and a sense of humor—are indubitably hers. These qualities give authenticity and beauty to her work and are noticeable not only in her masterful treatment of the subject but in her direct and forceful style. *Our Southwest* is not only about the Southwest, it is the Southwest.

Oklahoma A. and M. College

EDWARD F. WILLIS

Arneson, Ben A., *The Democratic Monarchies of Scandinavia*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1939. pp. xii, 244.)

Gooch, R. K., *The Government of England*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1937. pp. x, 326.)

Pollock, James K., *The Government of Greater Germany*. (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1938. pp. xiv, 213.)

These three books are volumes in the series of short texts for courses in comparative government called "The Governments of Europe." Arneson's description of the governmental structures and political institutions of the Scandinavian monarchies fills a long-recognized gap in the English language literature of political science. Unfortunately the course of the present war has rendered all except possibly the materials on Sweden only of historic interest. Since the book must be used in an almost complete absence of complementary materials in English it is fortunate that the author has been careful to cover fully the formal aspects of Scandinavian political institutions as well as to provide brief but thorough background materials of an historic and geographic character. The comparative method in the main has been employed in that successive chapters deal with such subjects as party organization and electoral procedure, legislative procedure, and administrative organization, but the danger of confusion inherent in this procedure has been avoided and the convenience of the book for reference purposes has been enhanced through the use of separate descriptive sections for Sweden, Norway, and Denmark in each chapter followed by paragraphs of summary and comparison.

The author of a new text on British political institutions has neither the advantages nor the disadvantages of one presenting for the first time a treatment of a new field. Neither is he free from comparison with previous works nor is he compelled by a general absence of reference materials to an absolute completeness in the coverage of subject matter. Dr. Gooch has produced a text specially suitable for a course in which attention is devoted to a variety of foreign political institutions and only in part to that of Great Britain. He has given special attention to those points on which pedagogical difficulties frequently arise, for instance the conveying to American students of the sense in which the word constitution is used in British political parlance. Although his extensive analytical discussions of problems of this sort at times are unduly discursive and involve excursions into philosophical background possibly more suitable to lectures than to the basic text, on the whole the attention devoted to these questions is an advantage and serves well to elucidate concepts normally elusive for American students. All essential aspects of the British political system are adequately presented in this book, and the arrangement whereby the first third of the book is devoted to presenting the necessary introductory materials relating to the country and its subdivisions, to the role of the voters, to party organization, and to the nature of the constitution before the more concrete aspects of the executive, legislative, and judicial organs are considered will be found especially useful in the teaching of British government in which an early consideration of the formal provisions may permanently obscure the student's conception of the basic political arrangements.

Some features of the treatment, however, are not wholly satisfactory. The sharp conflict in British politics resulting from the basic difference in aims of the two major parties and its effect upon the future stability of the unwritten understandings upon which the British constitution is based—aspects emphasized in several recent publications of H. J. Laski—is hardly made apparent to the reader. One might also receive the impression that the British governmental system is in operation more democratic than the persistent survival of upper-class dominance in politics in fact allows it to be. Finally, the relations in either a legal or a practical sense of the self-governing dominions with the government of Great Britain are left in an even more vague state in this presentation than their admittedly confusing juridical basis necessitates.

Of Pollock's treatment of the Nazi dictatorship in Germany it may be said, first, that the complicated administrative structure is presented in an array of not too essential detail which in view of its basic principle of hierarchic organization would seem irrelevant in a text devoted to the general features of a foreign political system, and, secondly, that no adequate attention is given to the social and economic implications of the régime. Where the latter are at all considered the author has relied uncritically upon official Nazi claims to such an extent that, were it not for the critical paragraphs devoted to church policy and to the ruin of the German universities, a reader might easily assume the book to be an apology for the Nazi system. It is unfortunate that in the author's

repeated praise of administrative simplifications introduced by the Nazis to improve the "efficiency" of the various departments of the state or of the party machine the basic political question "Efficient for what?" is never raised. Surely the author demonstrates in detail the complete lack of effective democratic control over any aspect of the Nazi political organization though this is hardly presented as a distinctive or noteworthy circumstance but almost as a matter of course. It seems strange that students should be encouraged to view in the same way the introduction of integration into the police mechanism of a ruling clique as they would the same type of improvement in the administrative mechanism of an American state, presumably restricted in some measure to "efficiency" in directions and for purposes selected by the representatives of a free population.

In discussing the extensive regulatory activities affecting business and labor through the "estate" organizations as well as through the regular bureaucracy the question "What sort of regulation?" is wholly ignored. Thus the National Economic Court, it is said, "gives the government a much more direct and speedy method of controlling and regulating 'Big Business' than is provided in the United States under the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act," but no indication is given as to what type of regulations the Court enforces, while the student is left to suppose either that they are a German counterpart of the Sherman Act and the Federal Trade Commission Act or, worse, that the essential matter is something called "regulation" rather than the specific and undoubtedly different contents of the German and American statute books.

In the consideration of the German Labor Front the impression is allowed to persist that the Trustees of Labor and the Social Honor Courts engage in a sort of industrial arbitration (at least in some sort of balancing or adjusting of the respective claims of employer and worker), whereas in actual German law terms of employment are fixed unilaterally by the employer subject only to a broad restraint by the trustee on political grounds, without reference to any labor representation, and the Social Honor Courts exist only to penalize personal violence or humiliation inflicted upon an employee by his employer or the latter's representative (he must be injured in his "social honor"; the pocket-book is not involved) or, more important, to punish workers who excite discontent with the employer's policies. The fact that the court is in essence a criminal tribunal before which cases are prosecuted by the labor trustee, and in no sense a civil forum for employer-employee disputes, is not made clear.

The author's complacency with the condition of the German treasury on the basis of a set of figures compiled for the American National Industrial Conference Board in the admitted absence of official data for expenditures seems hardly justified by his arguments. The figures given themselves show that the public debt has doubled since the Nazis came to power, and the fact that the increase was in short-term items does not indicate good government credit, but, as the footnote shows, merely indicates the extensive payment of running expenses in scrip. How the author can feel confident that on the basis of an admittedly partisan organization like the charity enterprises of the Nazi Party "the

unfortunate individual who needs care or advice will not be overlooked," especially in view of his own figures showing the halving of "Welfare and Health" expenditures by the government since the Nazi coup, is incomprehensible unless the emphasis is on the word advice.

While this book undoubtedly presents a clear and comprehensive account of the basic features of Nazi public law and of the structural arrangements of Nazi administration, nowhere is any adequate explanation given of how the Nazis built up their political following, or where their followers came from, nor is there any adequate discussion of the questions of how and to what ends the Nazis use the exceptional political power which has fallen into their hands. Indeed, a reader would never learn from this book that the Nazis systematically employed personal violence against individual opponents both before and after they came to power, although this is in fact a basic feature of their political tactics and in all probability a significant factor in determining their success. Nor would the reader infer that the persecutions extensively ascribed to Nazi Germany were anything more than the removal of "undesirable persons (i.e., Jews and liberals)" from positions of influence in the population.

The University of Texas

G. LOWELL FIELD

Ziskind, David, *One Thousand Strikes of Government Employees*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940, pp. x, 279.)

This is a book worthy of notice. It subjects to careful investigation a commonly expressed opinion used as an argument against organization among government workers or as a not-to-be-questioned statement of the relation between the employees of government and their employer, the state. The conclusions which must be drawn from Mr. Ziskind's work are unequivocal affirmatives: there can be strikes among government employees; there have been many such strikes in the United States; they have been effective in securing the demands of the workers.

The strikes listed have not been limited to one type of workers. Available records extending over a century produce a catalogue of 1,116 strikes: 3 in public legislation and administration; one by the senators of the State of Connecticut; 66 in public protection; 23 in public education; 94 in public health and sanitation; 72 in public road construction; 18 in public parks and recreation; 62 in public property maintenance; 114 in publicly owned utilities; 664 in public employment projects.

Anyone who has attempted to gather information on strikes knows how incomplete are records either official or non-official and will agree enthusiastically with Mr. Ziskind that if there is official note of 1,116, how many must there have been? Sufficiency of records is limited by an unwillingness to accept the fact and a desire to differentiate between strikes in government employment and those in private industry. On the one hand colorless terms are used such as "row," "dispute," "stoppage," etc., and on the other hand strongly malodorous terms such as "treason" or "mutiny."

Since 1900 strikes in private and in public employment have shown the same peaks, but with the significant difference that in private industry there were more than twice as many strikes in the War and immediate post-War years as in the depression period while strikes in public employment were approximately eight times as many in the period since 1930 as in the years from 1917 to 1925. That is, strikes in government work are becoming increasingly important and are a feature of expanding functions and increasing economic activity of government which cannot be ignored. One inescapable corollary is that the government no longer can be insisted upon as a neutral umpire between workers and employers. It has itself become a hirer of labor in multifold activities.

The unfamiliar feature of the last decade has been the strike on public employment projects. In the first two and one half years of its program, the W. P. A. had 571 recorded strikes (p. 139), one at least in each of all but five of the states. The demand of the strikers was usually a higher wage but there were many grievances peculiar to the Federal Works Program. A prolific cause of trouble not only in the last decade but in all government strikes has been the refusal of government officials to allow organization of workers and the sometimes attendant issue of whether an accepted organization might affiliate with the general labor movement (p. 194). Collective bargaining has been officially accepted in some departments and in others it is required by law or by departmental regulation (p. 197). A general acceptance of the principle and policy of collective bargaining would be, Mr. Ziskind feels (p. 201, 246), highly desirable as giving a "regularly planned approach to all existing problems before the development of critical situations" . . . for it is even more exigent to avoid an open break in public than in private work.

It is useless to insist that the State, most emphatically a democratic State, is above and beyond those weaknesses and frailties which characterize individuals and non-public organizations and that it should not be subject to the same pressures and penalties. "In the absence of more satisfactory methods of adjusting labor difficulties, strikes must be expected to occur again and again. Their forceful suppression, were it possible to suppress them, would entail far more danger to our democracy, more harm to the independence, initiative and morale of our government workers, more distrust in public relations than do the strikes themselves. It is much more prudent to tolerate the strikes for whatever they are, to seek means of dealing directly with their causes and to perfect methods for disposing more expeditiously and economically with any grievances and disputes that may arise." (p. 259). This is the author's conclusion and while the student of governmental organization may question its validity, he cannot ignore it nor the study from which it issues.

High praise must be given for the technical presentation of the results of a piece of research which not only clearly organizes the data but analyzes and interprets to give meaning and significance.

The University of Texas

RUTH A. ALLEN

Watts, Arthur P., *A History of Western Civilization From the Reformation to the Present*, volume 2. (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940, pp. viii, 1,055.)

This book is an important addition to the widening stream of studies for survey courses in western civilization. It completes the two-volume set of Professor Watts' study, the first volume of which was published in 1939.

Textbooks for beginning courses in civilization continue to appear with bewildering rapidity. Each new book is expected to differ from its predecessors. In my opinion the distinguishing feature of Professor Watts' study is its admirable synthesis of historical development. Recognizing the multiplicity of factors in so wide a sweep of history, the author interlaces attitudes, sentiments, ideologies, political forms, social conflicts, and economic structures to produce an intelligible continuity of thought.

In the main the book should be called "A History of European Civilization." The study begins with the Protestant Revolt and concludes with the launching of World War II. The preface informs the reader of the importance of two pertinent topics, the church and nationalism. The book is divided into fourteen chapters, following the accepted canons of chapter titles and arrangement. The author has apportioned his material in a satisfactory fashion, although one might like to read Chapter Thirteen before taking up World War I. Various schools of thought are presented and ample room is left for individual interpretation and critical inquiry.

With this book teachers of civilization courses are not likely to complain about insufficient material on the social and intellectual aspects of history. It is rather unique that the three longest chapters in the book, each over a hundred pages in length, are devoted to the study of cultural development.

While the reviewer is reluctant to criticize a work written with such charm and penetration, a few criticisms of the bibliography are in order. The bibliographical materials are useful, as a whole, but, since they are intended for students, they should include more of the common source books which are available to all students. Surely some distinctive bibliographical aids on English history should be cited at the end of Chapter Four, in which eight pages are devoted to England alone. Only three books for supplementary reading are cited in the last chapter. Structurally the materials should be cited with the date and place of publication. From the standpoint of effective study it would be far better to list specific topics with detailed chapters or pages for collateral reading.

The index is good, but for a book of this kind more listing of persons would be an improvement. Unfortunately there are no illustrations and only five maps.

These may be regarded as comparatively slight blemishes, but they do not comport with the literary style and the high standard of scholarship which characterize the volume. The book is a storehouse of information representing a tremendous amount of work in the widest range of history. It cannot fail to stimulate the student and inspire confidence in the author's ability. Both teacher and student should welcome Volume Two of *A History of Western Civilization*.

Oklahoma Baptist University

C. W. PATTON

Chugerman, Samuel, *Lester F. Ward, The American Aristotle*. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1939, pp. xiii, 591.)

Lester F. Ward is undoubtedly one of the towering figures in the development of sociology; and at the same time one of the most neglected by those who write and teach in that field. So, publication of a biography and summary of his thought is an event of great importance and deserves the careful consideration of all those who aspire to literacy in the discipline. However, it must be recorded, with deep regret, that the effort under review does not make the most of its opportunities.

Perhaps the outstanding fault of the work by Chugerman is his too-obvious hero-worship. The author feels that his work was "a labor of love and a happy privilege" (p. 13) and hopes it may rectify the neglect of Ward, "one of the major intellectual crimes of the age." There is great need for such rectification, since Ward's principles are those on which Wilson based his "Fourteen Points," which activated Hoover in investigating social trends, are fundamental to Roosevelt's "New Deal," and are an expansion in a scientific framework of the liberalism of the Founding Fathers. Obviously, such a wide-spread appeal could be made only by an unusual man. But Ward *was* unusual. Among other unusual qualities we are assured (p. 41) that "His morals and aesthetics were kept as athletic as his muscles." Perhaps his athletic morality and aesthetics enable him to become "the peer of the best European scholars in thoroughness and productivity." (p. 48.)

Now, it is certainly true that Ward is deserving of a high place in the history of sociology. He was a brilliant and erudite thinker who said many things to which we might well pay close attention today. But the task of a biographer, I take it, is to set forth the contributions of his subject and allow the reader to judge of their worth. In this case, it seems, Chugerman would have accomplished his purpose of awakening interest in and admiration for Ward much more effectively if he had allowed the Master to speak through him, rather than undertaking to speak for the Master.

In fact, Chugerman has done a worthwhile, though not spectacularly successful, job of arranging Ward's thought under various topics, as philosophy, biology, psychology, anthropology, and various more sociological categories, as social forces, teleology, philosophy of history, sex and family, environmental forces, melioration, etc. On the whole the quotations are well chosen, but somehow fail to leave the reader with a connected synthesis of Ward's social theory.

One also feels the lack of any attempt either to place Ward accurately in the stream of developing sociological thought or to evaluate critically his contribution to that stream. His relations with other American sociologists of his time, and with Europeans, especially the Austro-German group, who were writing in the field, are badly neglected, whereas it would seem peculiarly appropriate for a great synthesist to be synthesized. In fact, it appears to this reviewer, that Ward offers an excellent opportunity for someone to do a fine piece of work which will interpret him in terms of his background and associations. Chuger-

man has turned up much of the materials such a study would use, but he has not put them together into a pattern. Rather are they left in the form of a heap of building material.

The University of Texas

HARRY ESTILL MOORE

DuVal, Miles P., Jr., *Cadiz to Cathay. The Story of the Struggle for a Waterway Across the American Isthmus*. (Stanford University, Cal.: Stanford University Press, and London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1940, pp. xix, 554, maps and illustrations.)

Cadiz to Cathay is an intriguing title and could mean one of a number of things, but the sub-title informs the reader that here is told the story of the Panama Canal. The author is a commander of the United States Navy, but his opinion and assertions in this volume are to be regarded as those of a private individual. The Foreword, written by William Franklin Sands of the United States diplomatic service, gives much food for thought. This book is the latest volume in Stanford Books in World Politics, of which Graham Stuart is the editor.

Cadiz to Cathay has seventeen chapters covering 456 pages. The appendix of eighty-two pages is very serviceable, particularly the first fifty-nine pages which contain copies of the various well-known treaties relating to the Panama Canal. For the student of this subject the appendix on the references consulted must be very helpful.

The first chapter, entitled "The Start of an Idea, 1502-1800," covers the most time and, together with the second chapter, presents the background of the story. The author explains with remarkable clearness why the United States negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, a compromise which hung like a millstone around the neck of the President and Secretary of State for half a century. The third chapter presents the evolution of our country's canal policy. In the fourth chapter the author explains why Great Britain released us from the obligations of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in negotiating the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. In this chapter DuVal says: "But how was the treaty to be changed? Fortunately for Secretary Hay, the British Empire in 1899 had become diplomatically isolated by the Boer War. In addition, England desired the United States as an ally in British Asiatic policies, later to be given expression in the so-called open door promulgated by Secretary Hay. These two facts caused the British to decide to end this struggle for a position in Central America . . ."

Seven men secure more consideration from the author than any others discussed, namely, four Americans—President Theodore Roosevelt, Secretary of State John Hay, Senator John Tyler Morgan of Alabama, ardent advocate of the Nicaragua route, and John Bigelow, representative of the Chamber of Commerce of New York who became a close friend of Buneau-Varilla; two Latin-Americans—Dr. Tomás Herrán, who negotiated the two treaties which bear his name, and Dr. Manuel Amador (Guerrero), who led Panamá to freedom and became its first president; and the French engineer—Philippe Buneau-Varilla,

who had much to do with the revolution in Panamá and was later Minister of Panamá to the United States. That consideration is well placed.

Much more could be written in review of this valuable and timely book. It must be said, however, that only the careful reading of it will demonstrate its worth. There is hardly room for doubt that *Cadiz to Cathay* will stand high in the esteem of students, teachers, and the general reader. The Stanford University Press did well to publish this book.

The University of Texas

R. L. BIESELE

Buthman, William C., *Rise of Nationalism in France: With special reference to the Ideas and Activities of Charles Maurras*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939, pp. 355.)

The defeat of France in 1870 and its repercussions upon the internal life of that country were the occasions for the development of what has come to be called French Integral Nationalism. The rise of this movement, representing essentially a rightist program for national rehabilitation, which took place under the leadership of Maurice Barrès and Charles Maurras, forms the topic of Dr. Buthman's book. He notes that the movement contained many elements already existing in contemporary French cultural life such as the decentralization theories of Barrès and Taine, the military activism of the Boulangist movement, and the anti-Semitism of the followers of Drumont. These tendencies became accentuated as a result of the humiliation of the French nation and expressed themselves on one side in attacks upon the capitalist and bourgeois economic and political order, the parliamentary system, and the Jews, and on the other in the defense of the military class and traditional, monarchical, social values.

Dr. Buthman devotes much of his book to discussing the influence exercised by these various currents in French life upon the intellectual development of Charles Maurras and on the concept of integral nationalism which he was to formulate in the pages of *L'Action Française*. This discussion is of value to-day since it is demonstrative of the effect of military defeat upon the thought and actions of a certain section of rightist French intellectuals. The recent erection of the "totalitarian" government of Marshal Pétain being in a certain sense the fulfilment of the political objectives of the integral nationalist movement.

To students of nationalism the book is of interest in that it shows the French integral nationalist movement, in contradistinction to most nationalist agitations, to have placed considerable stress upon the need for administrative decentralization and the development of provincial cultural autonomy. At the same time the movement was authoritarian in matters of policy determination and advocated the restoration of the prestige of the army and of the monarchical principle.

The bibliographical appendix is an extensive one and affords an excellent point of departure for those wishing to carry their study further. It is regrettable that the organization of the book is in some instances rather jumbled and that the subject is carried down only to the commencement of the first world war. It is to be hoped, especially in the light of the present European situation, that

the author will find the leisure to continue his research and to trace the flowering of integral nationalism in France, its relations with the fascist movement in other countries, and its influence upon French politics from 1914 to the present. The chief virtue of the book lies in the fact that it fills what up until now has been a lamentable gap in the English literature on the background and rise of French Integral Nationalism.

The University of Texas

H. MALCOLM MACDONALD

Bartlett, F. C., Ginsberg, M., Lindgren, E. J., and Thouless, R. H., *The Study of Society: Methods and Problems*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939, pp. xii, 498.)

Cooperation in the fields of sociology, social psychology and social anthropology is the keynote to this volume from the collective pen of some two dozen English social scientists.

Although the nineteen articles of which the volume is made up are divided into sections dealing with the three disciplines concerned, both their content and the nature of the process through which they were prepared indicates great overlapping. For instance, intelligence testing in anthropology is placed in the section dealing with social applications of psychological tests. Throughout, references are made to the work of persons in other disciplines than that of the writer, and the lists of references at the end of each chapter display the same eclecticism. Each chapter, it is revealed in the preface, was originally written by some member of the group, was then typed and sent to all other members of the body who met at intervals and criticized the work of each other; after which the contributions were revamped to meet the criticisms offered. So thoroughly was this procedure adhered to that when R. B. Cattell came to America his work was completed by C. J. C. Earl.

The book has another feature which may seem somewhat strange to social scientists in this country. It is deliberately designed to appeal to the amateur investigator and encourages such a person to make studies of his own community or other social units which may come under his observation in the hopes that such may prove valuable in themselves and as materials for more formal scholars. Further, the object of such study is to improve social conditions. It is frankly stated: "There is today widespread recognition of the fact that the future of human civilization depends to a high degree upon Man's capacity to understand forces and factors which control his own behaviour."

In general, the essays undertake the task of stating the problems in a segment of one of the three social sciences, indicating methods which seem applicable, and of reviewing the work already done, with critical comments liberally injected. Formal methodology is at a minimum; basic assumptions are commonly accepted. However, Thouless does discuss the problems of terminology in social psychology, and Ginsberg's paper deals with sociology in a rather fundamental and theoretical way. The quality of the writing is high, the references well selected and adequate, the suggestions of problems pertinent. The book carries

out the purpose of its authors to provide a handbook for the social researcher; and as such should find wide acceptance.

It might be objected that the volume does not include all of the social sciences, and, hence, is incomplete. The authors forestall such criticism, in part, by saying that economics was not included because economic problems have been presented much more adequately than have those of the other social sciences. Still, it might be a good idea to see a group of students attempt a synthesis of the problems and methods of a larger list of social disciplines.

The University of Texas

HARRY ESTILL MOORE

Bird, Charles, *Social Psychology*. (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940, pp. xiii, 564.)

In any supposedly scientific field the strategic point of discussion about the literature of that field is to be found in a consideration of the methodology employed by the writer. This is particularly true of those fields which come under the rubric "social science" inasmuch as these areas of scientific investigation are not characterized by a methodology having either the unanimity or the effectiveness of that which the so-called natural sciences are able to display. In this current text book in the field of social psychology Professor Bird continues to make use of the extreme positivistic methodology which has been so persistent a characteristic of the members of his profession. Perhaps it is being too pessimistic to take the part of those who completely despair of any genuinely fruitful work from the social psychologists, but it is certainly not going too far on the basis of our present theoretical development to say that this field will never be significantly fruitful until the men working in it fully realize that it is quite possible to work with variables and factors not reducible to terms of quantitative measurement,—until they realize it and cease to have an inferiority complex about it. Professor Bird fails completely at this point. Thus one finds on page three that: "Primarily our concern will be with social behavior which has yielded to measurement or to some form of objective expression, as well as with principles having explanatory value and based upon controlled investigations." Numerous other passages illustrative of this sort of thinking are to be found throughout the first two chapters of the book. This emphasis on the objective and measurable is coupled with the other usual positivistic feature, the confusion of science and policy work.

This is more serious than it appears to be on the surface. As Professor Bird insists, a text in the field of social psychology should throw light on the "dynamic factors in behavior which impel men to action" (p. 3), but the methodology that he employs throws certain impassable barriers in the path of his studies. Obviously so, since many of the factors of which he speaks are reducible neither to the sort of quantitative measurement nor to the sort of "controlled investigation" that Professor Bird has in mind. The limitations of the method show up in the analyses of, or predictions about, the present situation. Again on page three one finds the following: "The spread of literacy is transferring

the control of people from rulers and leaders who use brute force to those who appreciate the persuasive power of words and other vehicles of meaning such as pictures and cartoons." Now such an error as this can be accounted for by either laziness and backwardness on the part of the author or by the failure of his methodology to allow for consideration of factors crucial to the problem in hand. Professor Bird's book is by no means to be generally characterized by the first possibility, so that it appears to be a legitimate conclusion that the second possibility is the strategic cause of the phenomenon.

The University of Texas

MARION J. LEVY, JR.

Sedgwick, W. T., Tyler, H. W., and Bigelow, R. P., *A Short History of Science*, revised edition. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939, pp. xxi, 512.)

The revised edition of W. T. Sedgwick, H. W. Tyler, and R. P. Bigelow's *A Short History of Science* is a study which should have wide usefulness, for, while it is intended as a text for students in the history of science, it is equally valuable for supplementary reading in civilization courses and related studies.

This book grew out of a course in the history of science offered at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1907 by Professors Sedgwick and Tyler. Professor Tyler continued the course until his retirement in 1930. In 1917 the first edition of the book appeared. When, in 1932, Professor Tyler became Honorary Consultant at the Library of Congress, he found excellent facilities for the revision of the text. This work was in progress at the time of his death in February, 1938, and has now been completed by Professor Bigelow.

Through the seventeen chapters and appendix of this absorbing book the reader views a panorama of fundamental scientific ideas from the dawn of history to the close of the nineteenth century, with a skillful interweaving of personalities and historical forces. The authors begin their study by portraying the origin of science, with a complete analysis of Greek and Islamic science. Then follow chapters covering the Roman era, the progress of science from the crusades to 1450, the new astronomy, the natural and physical sciences, the scientific advance during the nineteenth century, and inventions and engineering, all of which are readable and informing. Throughout the volume are numerous remarkable illustrations. The index and especially the chronological list of important names, dates, and events add greatly to the utility of the book.

Some critics may bemoan the omission of the history of science during the twentieth century, but the authors present in the preface convincing reasons why they "deliberately abstained from any attempt to bring the history up to date."

While the reviewer is reluctant to criticize a work written with such scholarly completeness, a minor criticism may be in order. The book has a good bibliography at the end of each chapter and an almost exhaustive pertinent reference list in Appendix C. These references would be more useful if critical evaluations were made of the more important ones.

A Short History of Science is the product of that type of research on which depends the progress of modern historical studies.

Oklahoma Baptist University

C. W. PATTON

Glueck, Sheldon and Eleanor, *Juvenile Delinquents Grown Up*, (New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1940, pp. viii, 330.)

This volume is the result of a follow-up study of a large group of juvenile delinquents over a period of fifteen years. The youths, originally studied by the same authors in their earlier report, *One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents*, are here followed in their subsequent careers from an average age of fourteen years to an average age of twenty-nine years. Analysis of the behavior of these youths in terms of recidivity, reformation, types of crimes committed at different ages, types and extent of corrective treatment, and general social environment, has permitted correlation of masses of data bearing on the effect of peno-correctional treatment of various sorts.

From the analysis of the factors concerned with the further delinquent behavior of the youths under consideration, original prediction tables have been constructed for the prognosis of individual behavior at different age levels and under the impact of different types of corrective treatment. Such formulas, employed by juvenile court officials, should, according to the authors, allow more flexible and constructive application of peno-correctional procedures. Should the use of formulas of this type prove efficacious, present methods of application of existing types of treatment may be considerably modified.

This study should recommend itself to the social statistician as well as to the student of social problems. The construction of prediction formulae is at best an uncertain undertaking. The authors of the present volume, apparently aware of the dangers inherent in the indiscriminate application of techniques of objective research to data of a qualitative nature, have restricted themselves to the simpler measures of central tendency and contingency. The resulting conclusions tend to inspire a good deal more confidence than much of the contemporary statistical treatment of social phenomena.

The University of Texas

GORDON BROWDER

Groves, E. R., *The Family and Its Social Functions*. (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1940, pp. 648.)

Professor Groves' reputation as a pioneer and an authority in the field of the sociology of the family makes any work from his pen deserving of the utmost attention from his colleagues. In this his latest publication in the field Professor Groves sets forth his conception of the functional relations of the family to society. After defining his point of view, Professor Groves takes up each of the several functions which the family performs and subjects it to an intensive analysis. He concludes with an extensive review of social theory as it relates to the family and with a prediction of the future development of the family.

While granting the author's right to adopt any point of view he chooses in approaching his subject, the reviewer nevertheless finds it hard to accept or comprehend exactly Professor Groves' position. Throughout the book there is implicit an organismic conception of the family. Thus we find the author writing that the "family in transition is seeking the same fitness in relation to its environment that the biological organism struggles for in its efforts to survive." (p. 29-30). Or again, ". . . this does not mean that the family must withdraw from the world and save itself by isolation from its modern environment, but rather that its stability must come not from subserviency to external occurrences but by maintaining values that permit a discriminating adjustment." (p. 28). So to differentiate between the family and its "environment" seems to mistake the nature of the relation of the familial institution to the rest of the institutional framework of a society. Also when Professor Groves speaks of the "social functions that belong to the family," there is implicit an assumption which seems to overlook the relativity of these functions to a particular cultural milieu. It is doubtful if one can discuss the "functions" of the family except in a particular cultural context.

Sociologists should find the two chapters on the history of social thought as it pertains to the family quite valuable. They demonstrate succinctly the possibilities of an approach to the study of social theory which has been too long ignored by students in the field. If Professor Groves' book contained nothing else, these two chapters would still make it a valuable contribution to the literature of the family and social theory.

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HIRAM J. FRIEDSAM

Bernard, L. L., *Social Control*. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1939, pp. ix, 711.)

Social control is the most important of all social problems, because every discovery of knowledge of social life has value only in the degree that it enables man to exercise better control over himself or over his environment, and it is especially important at the present time because of the revolutionary change taking place in the form of control that dominates in the great nations of the world. E. A. Ross was the first sociologist to visualize social control as a special study and to show the part it plays in all aspects of human culture.

The work of Bernard does not pretend to cover all aspects of social control but to give a concrete and factual presentation of the methods and techniques now generally employed as a means of control. It has two main divisions: First, the means of control by the people who control for their own benefit. These means are designated as exploitive. Second, the means of control by the people who have at heart the interest of society as a whole. These means are designated as constructive. The exploitive means of control include the use of force, punishment, reprisals, intimidation, graft, intrigue, censorship and repression, etc. The constructive means of control include the resort to revolutions, regimentation, standardization, the dissemination of religions and ethical ideals, the establishment of law and educational institutions.

The two chief merits of the book are: first, that it gives case studies, i.e., historical or contemporary illustrations of each kind of control; and second, makes clear that the remedy for the exploitive means of control, and the way to make effective the constructive means, is to introduce more social and civic training in our schools, from top to bottom.

In his last chapter, dealing with education, Bernard says, "It seems to be quite certain that no type of democratic institution can survive on the basis of vocational or technical efficiency alone. Neither can democracy thrive exclusively on the basis of knowledge, even of government and governmental processes. There must be also a will among the people to cooperate among themselves for the promotion of the common welfare." The greatest need, therefore, for an efficient social control is moral idealism.

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JEROME DOWD

Book Notes

The fourth edition of James T. Young's *The New American Government and Its Work* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940) retains the approach found in the earlier editions. The author believes that the really important problems of American government are those of the relation between the economic order and the government. Acting on this belief he has devoted a very large portion of his text to the work of the federal government in the field of regulating transportation and communication, anti-trust laws, and labor legislation. This is followed by several chapters dealing with similar state functions. These chapters are well written and thoroughly up-to-date in their discussions of recent legislation and Supreme Court decisions. For anyone who believes with Young that the subject of government and business should receive the chief emphasis in an American Government course this is an excellent text. Those who do not believe this might hold this text poorly balanced. Such topics as constitutional history, political parties, legislative procedure, and government personnel are crowded into a very few chapters. One's judgment of the text will be determined on how closely his own idea of the correct topical emphasis coincides with Young's.

D. S. S.

The third edition of *Essentials of American Government* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1940, pp. viii, 634) by Frederic A. Ogg and P. Orman Ray—replacing the second edition published in 1936—is a condensation of their well known *Introduction to American Government*, the latest edition of which is that of 1938. This text, which is designed for use in shorter courses in American Government and Politics, includes carefully prepared discussions of recent changes in American Government and of important legislation passed since 1936. As stated in the Preface, the authors have taken the opportunity of inserting a considerable amount of new material dealing with developments

since the larger book was issued. Included in the new matter are summaries of the Social Security legislation, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 and other important pieces of "New Deal" legislation. These additions have been made with their usual care and thoroughness. In this edition is to be found the same arrangement of material used in the previous editions with a few changes designed to make the work more logical and complete.

D. E.

Dictatorship in the Modern World (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press; London: Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1939, pp. xiv, 362), edited by Guy Stanton Ford, is a revision and expansion of the book by the same title which appeared in 1935. Six of the seven essays which made up the first edition have been revised and one has been omitted. Nine new essays have been added extending both the scope and the territory covered. The newly added essayists are John N. Hazard (The Soviet Union), Thomas K. Ford (Kemalist Turkey), Harold S. Quigley (Dictatorship in the Far East), Calvin B. Hoover (The Economics of Fascism), Peter H. Odegard (Propaganda and Dictatorship), Mildred Adams (Women under Dictatorships), Sigmund Neumann (The Political Lieutenants in Modern Dictatorship), and Joseph R. Starr (The Chronology of Dictatorship in Post-War Europe). Thus a very useful and popular book has been very much improved.

O. D. W.

Those who read Frederick Lewis Allen's *Only Yesterday*, which so admirably told the story of the 1920's, will welcome his *Since Yesterday* (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1939, 1940, pp. xiv, 362), which narrates equally well the events of the 1930's. Obviously, the later book is more preoccupied with economic and political happenings. Here is related in masterful style the tragedy of 1929, the "Down, Down, Down" trend of the Hoover era, and the "ups and downs" of the New Deal period. Other phases of the life of the thirties, while not given the space allotted to similar developments in the earlier book, are not neglected. The two books, taken together, constitute an invaluable chronicle of the rapidly changing ways of living in the United States in the twenty-year period between two world wars.

O. D. W.

Leviathan and the People (University, Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1939, pp. ix, 182) by R. M. MacIver contains six lectures delivered at Louisiana State University in 1939. As the title indicates the general theme is that of the expanding powers and functions of the modern state and of the comparative merits of democracy and dictatorship as means of exercising those powers and functions. The test of the two forms of rule under modern conditions, the writer believes, is to be found in the ultimate ability of one or the other to solve the problems of contemporary society. The treatment is objective; the case for each is fairly presented.

O. D. W.